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The Accord Acts Twenty Years Later

The authors examine key provisions of the Accord Acts and the experience with
them to date, and make comparisons with other jurisdictions. They address
regulatory issues, such as the resource conservation powers of the Boards, the
relationship between the Boards and other agencies, and the relative success of
regulation streamlining efforts. Finally, they consider exploration and development
matters and commercial issues such as flow-testing of exploration wells, benefits,
royalty agreements, Board guidelines, disclosure of information, and conditions
or requirements attached by the Boards to authorizations.

Les auteurs examinent les principales dispositions des lois de mise en ceuvre
de /Accord ainsi que leurs incidences jusqu'. maintenant, et ils 6tablissent des
comparaisons avec ce qui se produit dans d'autres ressorts. Ils 6tudient des
questions r6glementaires, par exemple les pouvoirs des Offices en mati~re de
conservation de la ressource, la relation entre les Offices et d'autres organisations
ainsi que le succ~s relatif des travaux de simplification des reglements. Enfin, ils
examinent des questions relatives I I'exploration eti I'exploitationet se penchent
sur des enjeux comme les essais de d6termination de I'6coulement des puits
d'exploration, les retombees dconomiques, les accords de redevance, les lignes
directrices des Offices, la divulgation de renseignements et les conditions ou les
exigences dont les Offices assortissent les autorisations.
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Introduction
The Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act
(Newfoundland Accord Act),' and the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore
Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act (Nova Scotia Accord
Act)2 (collectively, the Accord Acts) represent joint management schemes
based on political compromises following years ofdisputes and negotiations.
The most important developments include: the introduction of the Canada
Oil andGas LandRegulations3 in 1961; jurisdictional disputes between the
Atlantic provinces and Canada (coupled at times with threatened references
1. S.C. 1987, c. 3 [Newfoundland Accord Act]. The Newfoundland and Labrador counterpart is
Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Newfoundland and Labrador Act, R.S.N.L.
1990, c. C-2. (collectively the Newfoundland AccordActs).
2. S.C. 1988, c. 28 [Nova Scotia Accord Act]. The Nova Scotia counterpart is Canada-Nova
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation (Nova Scotia) Act, S.N.S. 1987, c. 3
(collectively the Nova Scotia AccordActs).
3.
C.R.C., c.1518.
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to the Supreme Court of Canada); the beginning of deep water drilling in
1966; various federal proposals for revenue sharing; the Supreme Court
of Canada decision in 1967 on the British Columbia Offshore Reference
(confirming the federal position that Canada was entitled to the rights of
exploration and exploitation of resources in offshore areas); statements of
principles on proposed offshore administration and management regimes
with the Atlantic Provinces; the Clark government's short-lived proposal to
transfer ownership and jurisdiction of offshore mineral rights to the coastal
provinces; the National Energy Program and the infamous Crown Share;
the Hibernia reference to the Supreme Court of Canada in 1984; the 1982
Canada-Nova Scotia Accord (Nova Scotia Accord), subsequently revised
in 1986, and the 1985 Canada-Newfoundland Accord (Newfoundland
Accord) (collectively Atlantic Accords).4
Although the Hibernia reference to the Supreme Court of Canada5
definitively established that the rights to explore for and exploit the
offshore natural resources located on the continental shelf belonged to the
Canadian government, the practical reality of the constitutional division
of legislative power between provinces and the federal government on
other matters and the reluctance on the part of the federal government to
enact its own laws for the offshore areas subject to the Accord Acts has
meant that the legal framework for the commercial exploitation of these
offshore natural resources requires the involvement of, and coordination
with, onshore provincial jurisdictions. This requirement, coupled with the
4.
Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of
Newfoundland and Labradoron Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Managementand Revenue Sharing,
11 February 1985, s. 2(c), online: <http://www.cnlopb.nl.ca/publicat/reg/aa mou.pdf> [Newfoundland
Accord]. A parallel accord was reached between Canada and Nova Scotia, CanadaNova Scotia Offshore
Petroleum Resources Accord, 26 August 1986, s. 2(c), online: <http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/regulatory/
pdf/Accord.pdf> [Nova Scotia Accord]. This Nova Scotia Accord is based upon a previously reached
accord, Canada-Nova Scotia Oil and Gas Agreement (Nova Scotia) Act, S.C. 1983-84, c. 29. For a
review of the long winding road to the Nova Scotia Accord and the NewfoundlandAccord, see: Royal
Commission on Renewing and Strengthening Our Place in Canada, John Crosbie, Overview Paperon
the 1985 Canada-NewfoundlandAtlantic Accord (March 2003) at 259.
5.
Re Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland, [ 1984] 1 S.C.R. 86.
For other discussions of the Accord Acts scheme see Rob Grant, Q.C., Will Moreira, Q.C. & David
Henley, "Potential for Performance-Based Regulation in the Canadian Offshore Oil and Gas Industry"
(2006) 44 Alta. L. Rev. 1; Angus Taylor & Jim Dickey, "Regulatory regime: Canada-Newfoundland/
Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board Issues" (2001) 24 Dal. L.J. 51-86; Raymond E. Quesnel &
R.J. Thrasher "East Coast Project Financing Issues" (2001) 24 Dal. L.J. 215 at 224-27; Van Penick,
"Legal Framework in the Canadian Offshore" (2001) 24 Dal. L.J. 1; Douglas Black & F.V.W. Penick,
"Survey of Legal Issues: Canada Offshore Oil and Gas Developments" (1991) 30 Alta. L. Rev. 178;
R.G. Penney, "The Atlantic Accord: a model of cooperative federalism: a response to Paul Emond"
(1986) 14 Resources at 1-2; Colin P. MacDonald & R.S.G. Thompson, "The Atlantic Accord: the
politics of compromise" (1985) 24 Alta. L. Rev. at 61-80; D.P. Emond, "A Critical evaluation of the
Atlantic Accord" (1985) 12 Resources at 4-6; R.M. Sinclair, "The Atlantic Accord: joint management
of offshore oil and gas resources off Newfoundland and Labrador" (1985) 2 Bus. & L. at 52-55.
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historical, socio-economic and political circumstances of Atlantic Canada,
has resulted in the joint management regimes under the Accord Acts.
During the third and final reading of the Bill for the federal CanadaNewfoundland Offshore Petroleum Resources AccordImplementation Act,
the Hon. Jack Shields, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Energy,
Mines and Resources, described the Act as "stimulat[ing] economic
development and foster[ing] social justice" with the federal and provincial
governments as "equal partners."' 6 During the second reading of the Bill,
the previous Parliamentary Secretary for the Minister stated: "The Accord
will provide a stable and permanent management regime that recognizes
the equality of the federal and provincial Governments in the development
of offshore resources. It will provide a clear regulatory regime for
7
industry."
Similarly, during the third and final reading of the federal CanadaNova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act
the Hon. Jack Shields described the Act as having "at [its] heart.. .a new
shared management regime under which the province has an equal share
in decisions" which would "assure the Government of Nova Scotia of
its rightful place as an equal partner... in the management of petroleum
resources," and "set aside the question of which level of government has
jurisdiction" to "create a stable investment climate."8 The Act was also
lauded as bringing the benefits of training and employment and security,
of energy supply.
Exploration and development activity offshore Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador has brought a new focus on the regulatory
procedures and commercial arrangements governing those activities.
Although the AccordActs were implemented in the late 1980s, it was not
until the commencement of offshore commercial production in 1992 that
many of the provisions and processes under the AccordActs were tested in
practice. As commercial activity has increased and some of the anticipated
economic benefits have begun to materialize, political developments in
Atlantic Canada have tested the scope available for provincial initiatives
under what are still joint management regimes. This, coupled with what
could be generously described as a "hands-off' attitude of the federal
government towards East Coast energy development during the same
period, has created the legal and political environment in which the
AccordActs currently operate. Recent disputes over revenue sharing, and

6.
7.
8.

House of Commons Debates, Vol 129 (2 March 1987) at 3728.
House of Commons Debates, Vol 128 (26 May 1986) at 13598.
House of Commons Debates, Vol 129 (7 July 1988) at 17276.
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the effects on equalization arrangements, in relation to offshore resource
revenues have been the latest chapter in this continuing saga.
Nearly twenty years after their implementation, the AccordActs remain
the framework for east coast offshore development. In the intervening period
a number of issues have demonstrated both the strengths and weaknesses
of the Accord Acts approach. This paper reviews some of these issues,
specifically: the use of the Atlantic Accords in interpreting the Accord
Acts; the powers of the Boards and limitations on their roles as regulators
and their enforcement powers; the roles of the Boards, governments and
proponents in relation to benefits agreements and the standing of other
parties to challenge their actions; developments in relation to petroleum
practices such as: pooling, unitization, third party access to facilities, and
production flow testing; developments in private royalty agreements; and
the ongoing process of regulatory streamlining.
I. The Atlantic Accords
The Atlantic Accords9 themselves continue to play a role in the
interpretation of the AccordActs. Each of the Atlantic Accords contains an
important statement of principles that provides context for interpreting the
provisions in the Accord Acts.
One of the stated purposes oftheNewfouhdlandAccordis"to recognize
the right of Newfoundland and Labrador to be the principal beneficiary of
the oil and gas resources off its shores, consistent with the requirement
for a strong and united Canada." 10 This, and the equivalent provision in
the Nova Scotia Accord, are the focus of the current debate between the
federal government and these two Atlantic provinces over equalization in
the context of resource revenue."
A further purpose of the Newfoundland Accord is "to provide for
a stable and fair offshore management regime for industry."' 2 This is
expressly stated as a core purpose of the NewfoundlandAccord Act, and
of equal weight to the purpose with respect to the relationship between the
interests of the respective governments.
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized this "stable and
"fair management regime for industry" purpose and intention, and the
9.
Supra note 4.
10. NewfoundlandAccord,supra note 4., at s. 2(c); Nova Scotia Accord, supranote 4., s. 1.02(c).
11. See Press Release: "Premier Presents Nova Scotia's Case to Senate" (June 19, 2007), online:
Government of Nova Scotia <http://www.gov.ns.ca/news/details.isp?id=20070619009>.
12. Newfoundland Accord, supra note 4 at s. 2.(f); Nova Scotia Accord, supra note 4 at s. 1.02(0.
Note: The complete text of the Nova Scotia section states: "to ensure the continuance of a stable
offshore administrative regime for the industry consistent, insofar as is appropriate, with regimes
established for other offshore areas in Canada."
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contextual importance of the Newfoundland Accord, in interpreting and
applying the Newfoundland Accord Act.' 3 In 1982, Mobil Oil Canada,
Ltd., Gulf Canada Resources Limited, Petro-Canada Inc., and Chevron
Canada Resources Limited drilled the Nautilus C-92 discovery well.
In 1984, the companies requested a significant discovery declaration
(SDD) from the federal government in respect of the Nautilus well and
forty-one surrounding sections. In 1986, the Canada Oil and Gas Lands
Administration 4 informed the companies that it would recommend an
SDD with respect to eleven sections only. 5 The Minister of Energy, acting
upon this recommendation, made a SDD for eleven sections. Following
an unsuccessful appeal to the Minister in 1990, after the Canada Oil
and Gas Act was repealed, the companies applied to the Administrative
Board established under the new statutory regime for an SDD of twentyfive sections. The chairman of the Board responded by letter to the 1990
proposal and stated that it would not be put before the Board "[b]ecause
any application for an additional significant discovery would have to be
based upon the results of a well other than Nautilus C-92' and because
no additional well has been drilled, your letter, which is based upon the
Nautilus C-92 well, cannot be considered a bona fide application pursuant
16
to [s.] 71" of the federal NewfoundlandAccord Act.
The companies took their case to court, claiming that they had been
unjustly denied an opportunity to be heard by the Board. Although the
Supreme Court of Canada's determination was that the applicants did not
succeed on the merits, the Court found that the Board had failed to observe
its obligations under the NewfoundlandAccordAct. As Justice Iacobucci
stated, on behalf of the Court:
Finally, attention must be given to the object and scheme ofthe legislation
at issue. The federal and provincial Implementation Acts gave effect
to the provisions of the Atlantic Accord, and the Board must conduct
itself with the Accord in mind: s. 17(1). Two purposes of the Accord
were "to provide for a stable and fair offshore management regime for
industry" and "to provide for a stable and permanent arrangement for the
management of the offshore": see clauses 2(f) and (g).17

13. Mobil Oil CanadaLtd. et al. v. Canada-NewfoundlandOffshore Petroleum Board, [1994] 1
S.C.R. 202, [1994] 111 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) [Mobil].
14. Prior to the implementation of the NewfoundlandAccordAct, these matters were governed by the
CanadaOil and Gas Act, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 81, and the Canada Oil and Gas Lands Administration
was charged with the statute's administration.
15. Declarations of Significant Discoveries Order No. 0-6 (1986), S1/86-156, 20 August 1986.
16. For the complete facts, see Mobil, supranote 13 at paras. 3-5.
17. Ibid. atpara. 11.
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In terms of legislative history and intent, Justice lacobucci compared
the legislative scheme under the Newfoundland Accord Act to that which
existed under the CanadaOil and Gas Act. He noted that under the Canada
Oil and Gas Act, the Minister was invested with significant discretionary
authority in respect of SDDs. Under the AccordAct, however, he noted that
this discretion had given way to "an objective test which favours industry
participants."' 8
Justice lacobucci further noted that a purpose of the Newfoundland
Accord was "to provide for a stable and fair offshore management regime
for industry" (see cl. 2(f) of the Accord), that the applicant had a right of
procedural fairness, because of the significant effect on the applicant's
investment if a declaration of significant discovery is not made, and that
"industry fairness was an important goal of the Atlantic Accord."' 19 The
most significant recognition of this purpose has already been described,
in that "the ministerial discretion which governed SDDs under s. 44(1) of
the CanadaOil and Gas Act was replaced by s. 7 1(1) of the Newfoundland
Accord Act and a procedure that requires the objective reasonableness of
declarations."2 The broader point made by the Court is that "the Board
must conduct itself with the [NewfoundlandAccord] in mind."
Jacobucci J.'s recognition of an objective test and the requirement
of fairness to industry has been subsequently applied by Justice Barry of
the Newfoundland Supreme Court, Trial Division. Citing Justice Reed
from Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Energy, Mines and
Resources),2 Justice Barry stated that the legislative purpose of the
significant discovery provisions under the NewfoundlandAccord Acts is
"to accord someone who spends time and money exploring for oil and gas
22
the rewards which arise out of a discovery which is made.
It is clear from these decisions that the AccordActs are to be interpreted
in light of the legislative objective and purpose of achieving a stable
(and, in the case of Newfoundland, fair) offshore management regime for
industry. These principles are fundamental to the Atlantic Accords. It will
be interesting to see the extent of their influence in the future.

18. Ibid.at para. 9.
19. Ibid. atparas. 15-16.
20. Ibid. at para. 13.
21. Mobil Oil CanadaLtd. v. Canada (Ministerof Energy, Mines andResources) (1990), 35 F.T.R1
50, 74 Alta. L.R. (2d) 97 (F.C.T.D.).
22. Petro-Canadav. Canada-NewfoundlandOffshore Petroleum Board, [1995] 127 D.L.R1 (4th)
483 at 491, 133 Nfld. & P.E.1.R. 91 (Nfld. S.C.(T.D.)).
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II. Powers of the Boards
The Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NSOPB)
and Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board
(C-NLOPB) (collectively, the Boards) have responsibility for offshore oil
and gas activities including issuing and administering interests, monitoring
operations, and the approval of development and benefits plans. In addition,
the Boards are the lead regulator when regulatory responsibilities of other
23
provincial and federal agencies overlap with those of the Boards.
1. Appropriate use of guidelines
Each of the Accord Acts authorizes the relevant Board to issue and
publish, in such manner as the Board deems appropriate, guidelines and
interpretation notes with respect to certain provisions under the Accord
Acts including those dealing with benefits plans, licences and development
plan approvals.2 4 The Accord Acts are clear that these guidelines are not
statutory instruments.2 This reflects the principle that "a non-statutory
instrument cannot impose mandatory requirements enforceable by sanction;
' 26
that is, the regulator cannot issue defacto laws disguised as guidelines.
Nevertheless, the Boards have linked the content of their guidelines to the
conditions of the authorizations they issue. For example, condition 34 of
the C-NLOPB decision on Terra Nova requires the proponents to provide
in their Environmental Protection Plan "that the treatment and disposal of
wastes are consistent with the September 1996 Offshore Waste Treatment
Guidelines and with revisionsto these Guidelinesfollowing their approval
27
by the Board.
Because offshore operations and projects are so large and complex,
it is not surprising that legislative and regulatory gaps exist. Due to the
inaction of the federal and provincial governments in amending and
updating the AccordAct regimes, various sets of guidelines have been used
by the Boards to provide guidance in the absence of definitive legislation
and regulations. There is a concern that the Boards are using guidelines
23. Keith R. Evans, "Canadian East Coast Offshore Oil and Gas Industry: Sustainable Development
Through Cooperative Federalism" (2002) 26 Dal. L.J. 149 at 156.
24. Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 2, s.156(l); Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 1, s.
151.1(1).
25. Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 2, s. 156(2); Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 1, s.
151.1(2).
26. Ainsley FinancialCorp. v. Ontario (Securities Commission) (1994), 28 Admin. L.R. (2d) 1, 21
O.R. (3d) 104 (Ont. C.A.).
27. Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Development Board, Decision 2001.01: Application for
Approval, White Rose Canada-Newfoundland Benefits Plan, White Rose Development Plan
(Decision) St. John's NF: Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board, 2001).
[emphasis added]
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to create just such a de facto legislative scheme to the extent that the
guidelines create (or are part of) hard conditions and create operational
parameters.
Two examples of the guidelines that the Boards administer are the.
Offshore Waste Treatment Guidelines referred to above (issued in 2002
by the National Energy Board (NEB), C-NSOPB, and C-NLOPB), and
the Compensation Guidelines Respecting Damages Relating to Offshore
Petroleum Activity (issued jointly by the Boards in 2002).
The Offshore Waste Treatment Guidelines are intended to establish
a minimum standard applied by the Boards in making authorizations
concerning the treatment and disposal of wastes from petroleum drilling and
production operations. Failure to adhere to the contents of the guidelines.
exposes an offender to enforcement measures, as discussed below. These
guidelines largely deal with specific practices, volume and concentration
restrictions for various discharged substances (e.g., greenhouse gas
emissions and drilling mud). They also deal with the mixing of waste
discharge streams, the location of waste streams on offshore installations,
and the creation of environmental monitoring programs.
The Compensation Guidelines Respecting Damages Relating to
Offshore Petroleum Activity are designed to provide information about
compensation sources for persons claiming offshore petroleum-related
losses and the regulatory/administrative role of the Boards in that respect.
These guidelines establish a framework that encourages potential claimants
in respect of damage attributable to petroleum spills or debris, where the
cause of the damage is unambiguous, to contact operators with the goal
of a voluntary settlement. If unsuccessful, an application can be made to
a Board relating to an operator's security deposit. Where the identity of
the operator is unknown, applications may be made to either the Canadian
Association of Petroleum Producers Unattributable Damage program or
the Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund (in place since 1973).
The ability of the C-NLOPB to impose conditions as part of its
authorizations was examined by the Newfoundland Supreme Court in
2
Petro-Canada v. Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board.1
Petro-Canada, as the operator in respect of the King's Cove A-26 well,
had applied to the C-NLOPB for a declaration of significant discovery in
relation to an offshore test well. The C-NLOPB denied the request. PetroCanada successfully applied to quash the Board's decision by way of an
order in the nature of certiorari.

28.

Supra note 22.

296

The Dalhousie Law Journal

The drilling program authorization from the Board required the
operator to comply with the Draft Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum
Drilling Regulations "and all modifications and amendments thereto as
may be promulgated from time to time" (DraftDrillingRegulations). The
Draft DrillingRegulations defined "formation flow test" as "an operation
to induce the flow of formation fluids to the surface of a well for the
purpose of procuring reservoir fluid samples and determining reservoir
flow characteristics. 29
Subsection 177(2) of the Draft Drilling Regulations required every
operator to conduct a formation flow test if fluid samples and productivity
data were required to assist in the evaluation of a formation, and wireline
formation samples did not provide sufficient information.
Petro-Canada had run two drill stem tests on the well. The first
suffered from a mechanical error and the second produced 1.6 m3 of oil
over a six hour period. The fluid composition averaged six percent oil
before declining to zero at the end of the test. Petro-Canada had explained
to the Board that the reservoir and pressure data indicated a "washout"
during the course of the test and therefore it had extrapolated an estimated
production rate based on the maximum oil production rate during the course
of the drill stem test. The C-NLOPB initially denied the application and,
following receipt of a report from its Oil and Gas Committee (requested
by Petro-Canada under the Accord Act), rejected it a second time. The
Board's reasons were essentially that Petro-Canada's test results were
insufficiently compelling.
In the course of its application, Petro-Canada argued that the Board
exceeded its jurisdiction by requiring production to the surface in formation
flow testing in accordance with the Draft Drilling Regulations. Justice
Barry rejected that argument and held that the Board's power under section
133(l)(b) of the Newfoundland Accord Act to authorize, in its discretion
"such requirements ... as the Board determines or as may be prescribed"30
entitled the Board to require compliance with the draft regulations. He also
held that this did not conflict with a provision authorizing the Lieutenant
Governor-in-Council to make regulations requiring and prescribing the
making of tests and the taking of samples, where no such regulations had
been enacted.3'
This ruling upholds the Board's power to prescribe operational
conditions, including the incorporation by reference of the standards or

29. Draft Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum DrillingandProductionRegulations, infra note 84.
30. Supra note 22 at 487.
31. Ibid.at 509.
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specifications of other organizations, similar to that of a legislator. Justice
Barry noted in passing that a subsequent amendment to s. 144 of the
Newfoundland Accord Act, which allowed the Lieutenant Governor to
incorporate other standards or specifications by reference in the regulations
it was authorized to make, might require a different interpretation of the
Board's authority but that he need not decide this.32 What remains an
issue, however, is the scope and latitude enjoyed by the Board in its role
as rule-maker as well as regulator. The case does not provide clarity with
respect to the extent of the Board's powers, but signals that they may
be more substantial than one might have thought. In this case the Court
expressly recognized the Board's power to fix standards in the absence of
regulations contemplated by the AccordAct.
In the recent case of HiberniaManagementandDevelopmentCompany
Ltd. and Petro-Canadav. C-NLOPB,33 the Trial Division of the Supreme
Court of Newfoundland considered a situation where the Board, following
consultation with industry, had issued a set of Guidelines for Research
and Development Expenditures (R&D Guidelines).14 Other aspects of this
case are discussed in Section III below, but what is relevant for the present
purpose is that the applicants in that case submitted that the AccordActs
did not give the Board the power to impose expenditure obligations on the
applicants by means of the R&D Guidelines, as the guidelines permitted
under the AccordActs are intended to be administrative only and they did
not have the force of regulations under the Statutory Instruments Act.35
Adams J. dealt with this argument as follows:
However, in this case, Section 151.1 of the Act has given the Board the
express power to issue guidelines and interpretation notes in respect of,
among other things, the application and administration of Sections 45,
138 and 139. As stated by Orsbom, J., in Saint John's v. C-NLOPB,
supra,at paragraph 95:
Clearly, it was the intent ofboth governments that issues relating
Board, subject only to
to economic benefits would be left to the
36
joint direction from the governments.
As there had been no joint directive from the governments respecting
research and development, the Court was satisfied that the Board's decision
to establish the R&D Guidelines was a reasonable interpretation of the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Ibid.
2007 NLTD 14, 263 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 40 [HMDCandPetro-Canada].
Infra note 60.
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-22.
Supra note 33 at para. 55.
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Canada-NewfoundlandAccord and the Newfoundland Accord Act and
expressed the legislative intent of the governments regarding the power
of the Board to issue the R&D Guidelines and to make them binding upon
the applicants.
Both of these cases acknowledge the powers of the Board to make
guidelines binding upon parties carrying on operations offshore and
thereby fill perceived gaps in the legislative/regulatory schemes under
the Accord Acts.
2. Constraintson boardpowers
With respect to constraints upon the powers of a Board, the decision
in Saint John ' (City) v. Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum
Board37 is instructive. An application to the C-NLOPB for Development
Plan approval must include a development plan application (DPA), an
environmental impact statement (EIS) and a benefits plan. In approving an
application, the Board will generally accept these foundation documents
subject to specific conditions.
As part of the Terra Nova Benefits Plan, Petro-Canada, as operator, had
committed to a "best-efforts" plan to relocate engineering and procurement
activities to Newfoundland and Labrador. The C-NLOPB approved the
benefits plan subject to certain conditions, including that "as soon as
practicable after Project Sanction, the Proponent relocate engineering and
procurement activities for the Project to Newfoundland."38 Petro-Canada
subsequently asserted that, because of cost and scheduling concerns,
it was not practical to move engineering and procurement activities to
Newfoundland and Labrador. On 30 June 1998, the Board, based on its
interpretation of the "best efforts" condition, "reluctantly accepted" that
Petro-Canada had complied with the condition.39
The City of Saint John's asserted that the Board had failed in
its statutorily imposed duty to enforce this condition of the Board's
approval.40 Since the City and its citizens would have been the major
beneficiaries of any relocation of such activities to the province, the City
brought an application before the Trial Division of the Supreme Court of

37. (1998), 82 A.C.W.S. (3d) 796 (Nfld. S.C.(T.D.)).
38. Ibid. at para. I (citing Decision 97.02).
39. Ibid at para. 2.
40. Ibid.at para. 3. This action by the City involved the Mayor, Andy Wells, who was later in another
dispute relating to the Board, this time including the Province, who wanted Mr. Wells to be appointed
as the Chair of the Board, and the federal government, who, after a failure to reach agreement with
the Province and an arbitral procedure as required under the Accord Act, preferred the candidate
recommended by the arbitration panel. See Ruelokke v. Newfoundland and Labrador, 2006 NLTD
127, (2006), 258 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 308.
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Newfoundland to require the Board to enforce the condition imposed upon
Petro-Canada
One of the remedies the City sought in the application was an order of
mandamus to compel the Board to perform what the City asserted was the
Board's statutory duty - to force Petro-Canada to operate its engineering
and procurement operations out of Newfoundland and Labrador.4' Despite
the fact that the Court determined that the "Proponent did not in fact
comply with the Condition, ' 42 Justice Orsbom noted the following:
Inherent in the City's request for relief is the assumption that the Board
actually has the authority to force the Proponent to move its engineering
activities to Newfoundland. This assumption may not be well-founded.
The Board does possess certain powers of enforcement - notably the
power to revoke a licence or authorization. But whether its statutory
authority extends to a direct order to carry on work in a certain location
is an unanswered question. The ability to revoke a licence may provide
opportunities to achieve a particular outcome through influence and
persuasion, but the actual order of the Board sought by the City may not
be within the authority of the Board.43
This limitation on the Board's remedial authority is important. In HAMDC
and Petro-Canada,Justice Adams noted that the C-NLOPB's ability to
revoke a production operations authorization was "the ultimate mechanism
44
by which the Board may control activity in the offshore area."
There is a view that Boards ought not to dictate specific operational
methods and modes, nor should they have the power to dictate what shall
be done and when. That does not mean the Boards do not have a direct
impact upon the day-to-day operations of industry participants working in
the offshore. Quite the opposite is true. However, as these decisions have
noted, the Boards' powers of enforcement may be limited to their ability
to revoke licences or authorizations where the conditions of such licences
or authorizations have been breached. 45 This is a blunt instrument and, in
many circumstances, it may not be an appropriate remedy for failure to
comply with guidelines or conditions issued by the Boards.
Another avenue a Board might take is to treat the breach ofa condition or
requirement of an authorization or approval as "an environmental or social

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Ibid. at para. 66.
Ibid. at para. 88.
Ibid. at para. 100.
Supra note 33.
NewfoundlandAccordAct, supra note 1, s. 134(5).
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problem of a serious nature,' 46 which gives rise to the Board's statutory
power to prohibit the commencing or continuing of any offshore work or
activity. This provision may have a very limited scope, however a plain
interpretation of a "social problem of a serious nature" would probably
not include the absence of a transfer of engineering and procurement, and
even if it were concluded that it did, prohibiting work on a project such
as Terra Nova would have made little sense in the circumstances. While
a stop work order may be seen as less onerous than a suspension of the
authorization or licence, it is still a very reactionary response. Monetary
be a more effective means of achieving
penalties, for example, might
47
compliance in the future.
The Petro-Canadaand SaintJohn' cases demonstrate the uncertainties
about the rule-making role the Boards should play in a multi-jurisdictional,
expert context, given the limited enforcement remedies they have. The
notion of a "one-window" gateway of regulatory expertise is inconsistent
with the absence of technical rule-making authority. By contrast, the
Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB), the equivalent oil and gas
practices regulator in Alberta, although subject to statutes and regulations
passed by the legislator, also has the ability to pass regulations in its own
right in discrete areas. 48 In considering potential improvements in the
operation and effectiveness of the Accord Acts, it would be worthwhile to
spend some time on clarification of the powers of the Boards and, if they
are going to have an expanded rule-making authority, on their ability to
effectively monitor and enforce the rules they make. The present situation
under the Accord Acts invites problems and disputes, with the lacunae in
the legislative/regulatory regime due to government inaction being filled
by guidelines made by agencies lacking practical and effective powers of
enforcement.
On the other hand, if "smart" (in the sense, of performance-based)
regulation is more fully embraced for the Accord Acts, the setting of
principled standards by the legislators may provide the Boards a more
legitimate way to specify or influence operating practices subsequent to
the issuance of authorizations. Smart regulation has been an initiative in

46. Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 1, s. 56(1)(a); Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 2, s.
62(l)(a).
47. See, e.g., EUB Directive 019, which sets forth "non-compliance fees." ERCB Compliance
Assurance - Enforcement, 20 February 2007, online: <http://www.eub.gov.ab.ca/bbs/documents/
directives/Directive0l9.pdf>.
48. Alberta Energy and Utilities BoardAct, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-17, s. 29(2).
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the offshore context since 2002. 4 1 It consists of making regulations that
are outcome-based rather than prescribing the methods an operator must
employ to meet a legislative requirement. Blunt enforcement powers may
be less problematic when they target the breach of clear standards rather
than the enforcement of detailed guidelines. The guidelines would, in
other words, have a different role and not be enforced in a strict way, i.e.,
enforcement would only occur if the performance goal is not met. This
regulatory initiative is discussed in more detail in Section IX.
III. Benefits requirements
It has been observed that one of the key elements of the Accord Acts
is the desire to use a finite and exhaustible resource to create a lasting
economic legacy for the people of the respective provinces.50 The Accord
Acts establish that one of the requirements that proponents of offshore
developments must fulfill in order to obtain approval for a development
application is a benefits plan approval.
The AccordActs spell out the requirements that a Board must consider
prior to approving a benefits plan:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
employment of Canadians and residents of the Province, giving
first consideration to residents of the Province for employment
and training during the project;
participation of Canadian manufacturers, consultants, contractors
and service companies and, in particular, giving first consideration
to services provided from within the Province and to goods
manufactured in the Province, where those services and goods are
competitive in terms of fair market price, quality and delivery;
expenditures for research and development to be carried out in
the Province and for education and training to be provided in the
Province;
provisions to ensure that disadvantaged individuals or groups have
access to employment and business opportunities generated by the
project; and,
provisions to ensure manufacturers, consultants, contractors and

49. E.g., the Atlantic Energy Roundtable conference of 2002 highlighted "smart regulation" as a
goal to pursue in the offshore context, as did the federal 2002 Speech from the Throne, see Canada
"Speechfrom the Throne" 371 Parliament of Canada, 21d Session (2002) House of Commons Debates
(30 September 2002) at 1.
50. Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Benefits Plan Guidelines, (February 2006), online: Canada
Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board <http://www.cnlopb.nl.ca/publicat/guidelin/
benplan/benplan.pdf> at 1.2.
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service companies in the Province and other parts of Canada are
given a full and fair opportunity to participate on a competitive
basis in the supply of goods and services used in any proposed
work or activity."
Considering that much of the AccordActs are based upon the CanadaOil
and Gas OperationsAct (COGOA), it is not surprising that this language
closely reflects that found within the COGOA which states:
5.2 (1) In this section, "benefits plan" means a plan for the employment
of Canadians and for providing Canadian manufacturers, consultants,
contractors and service companies with a full and fair opportunity to
participate on a competitive basis in the supply of goods and services
used in any proposed work or activity referred to in the benefits plan.
(2) No approval of a development plan shall be granted under subsection
5.1(1) and no authorization of any work or activity shall be issued
under paragraph 5(1)(b), until the Minister has approved, or waived the
requirement of approval of, a benefits plan in respect of the work or
activity.
(3) The Minister may require that any benefits plan submitted pursuant to
subsection (2) include provisions to ensure that disadvantaged individuals
or groups have access to training and employment opportunities and to
enable such individuals or groups or corporations owned or cooperatives
operated by them to participate in the supply of goods and services2 used
in any proposed work or activity referred to in the benefits plan.1
The AccordActs provide for an additional layer of preferential treatment
to that mandated under the COGOA, giving priority to manufacturers,
consultants, contractors and service companies resident within the
applicable province above those resident in other parts of Canada, who,
in turn, receive preferential treatment to those not resident in Canada.
In practice, developing an acceptable benefits plans requires
involvement from project proponents, provincial authorities, federal
authorities and the applicable Board. Because ofthe highly political nature
of a benefits plan, the typical experience involves an initial negotiation
between the provincial government and the project proponents. Once an
agreement or understanding on appropriate benefits has been reached, this

51. Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 1, s. 45(3); Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 2, s.
45(3).

52.

R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-7, s. 5.2.

The Accord Acts Twenty Years Later

will form the basis of the benefits plan submitted by the proponents for
approval to the relevant Board. 3
Unlike the approval of a Development Plan, by nature a highly
technical document, the approval of a benefits plan, an inherently political
document, is not a "fundamental decision" under the Accords Act and
therefore not subject to approval by the Provincial Minister. In other words,
the approval of the benefits plan is strictly a matter for the Board, unless
the Board is issued a joint directive from both levels of government.'
In November 2006, EnCana filed a Development Application for Deep
Panuke with the C-NSOPB consisting of a Development Plan, CanadaNova Scotia Benefits Plan, a Socio-Economic Impact Statement and an
Environmental Impact Statement. Prior to filing its application, EnCana
had entered into an Offshore Strategic Energy Agreement (OSEA) with the
Province of Nova Scotia on 22 June 2006. The Nova Scotia Department of
Energy (NSDOE) represented the Province in negotiating the OSEA. The
C-NSOPB was not involved in the negotiation of the OSEA. In Section
3 of the Benefits Plan volume of its application, EnCana incorporated
Section 3 of the OSEA outlining EnCana's commitments to Nova
Scotia benefits, including its commitment to the statutory obligations of
Section 45 of the Nova Scotia Accord Act. EnCana further stated that
the OSEA describes additional commitments by EnCana to provide
specific industrial and employment opportunities for Nova Scotians, with
minimum commitments for person hours of work in Nova Scotia. 5
The C-NSOPB appointed a commissioner to oversee the public review
of the proposed Deep Panuke Offshore Gas Development Project. The
C-NSOPB and the NEB jointly drafted and circulated a draft list of issues
for the Deep Panuke Coordinated Public Review. Among the issues to be
considered was the following:
The Canada-Nova Scotia benefits plan having regard to, among other
things:
0 The extent to which the plan meets the requirements of the Accord
Acts by providing a process that gives residents of Nova Scotia,
53. The Letter of Intent entered into between the Province and the project proponents with respect
to the Terra Nova Project, for example, contained the benefits agreed between the Province and the
proponents. In the case of Hibernia, the Hibernia Framework Agreement contained a Section on
Benefits. See the discussion in HMDC and Petro-Canadav. C-NLOPB, supranote 33 at 20-2 1.
54. Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 1, s. 45(6); Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 2, s.
45(6).
55. EnCara Corporation, "Deep Panuke Offshore Gas Development Canada -Nova Scotia Benefits
Plan" (November 2006), online: C-NSOPB <www.cnsopb.ns.ca/whatsnew/pdf/Volume 3_Benefits_
Plan.pdf>.
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and other Canadians, a full and fair opportunity to participate on a
competitive basis in the supply of goods and services;
*

The extent to which the plan provides an acceptable process for the
employment of Canadians and, in particular, members of the labour
force in Nova Scotia in any proposed work or activity;

" The extent to which the plan provides an acceptable process and
commitment towards education and training in Nova Scotia including
provisions to ensure that disadvantaged individuals or groups have
access to training and employment opportunities and to enable them
to participate in the supply of goods and services; and
The extent to which the plan provides an acceptable program and
appropriate financial commitment for research and development in
Nova Scotia. 6
In her report, the Commissioner identified areas in which she felt the
proposed benefits plan to be deficient and concluded:
The Commissioner cannot recommend approval of the Canada-Nova
Scotia. Benefits Plan. There are no, provisions, other than making
monies available, with respect to education and training, and research
and development. There are no provisions to ensure that disadvantaged
individuals or groups have access to education, training and employment
opportunities to enable them to participate in the supply of goods and
services for the proposed Project. There is also a question about the impact
the definition of "Nova Scotia Person Hour" in the OSEA will have on
employment opportunities for current "residents of Nova Scotia. 7
The Deep Panuke application is the first instance in which an agreement of
a provincial government on the sufficiency of a proposed benefits plan has
been rejected. Prior to this occurrence, industry participants expected that
the negotiations surrounding a benefits plan would be a bilateral process
between project participants and the relevant provincial authorities. Once
an agreement was reached, it would form the basis of an acceptable benefits
plan which would then be brought forward for approval by the Board.

56. Report of the Commissioner to the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board on the Deep
Panuke Offshore Gas Development Project Public Review (8 May 2007), online: The National Energy
Board <https://www.nebone.gc.ca/l I -eng/livelink.exe/fetch/2000/ 90464/90550/189912/441384/472
807/461457/AOY813_-_Report of the CommissionerDeep_ PanukeProjectPublicReview_8_
May_2007.pdfnodeid=461458&vemum=0 at 3>. The second Deep Panuke hearing was conducted
before a Commissioner appointed by the C-NSOPB and a NEB member in simultaneous, parallel
processes (although not technically a panel, there was a common hearing) and each produce a report
for its respective Board.
57. Ibid. at 48.
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Because of the political nature of a benefits plan, there are some who
feel that the affected province should have the ultimate authority as to
the sufficiency of a particular benefits plan. 8 This, however, is not the
scheme under the Accord Acts, where the relevant Board clearly has the
exclusive authority to approve benefits plans. It will be interesting to see
whether that authority survives in the future.
1. Post-acceptanceconformity of approved benefits plans to section 45
The life of some offshore projects is measured in decades, not years.
Over time, the political climate in a given jurisdiction will change. Even
relatively short-term projects, such as Deep Panuke, are subject to changing
political circumstances. As offshore projects represent significant sources
of income to the affected province, the participants in an offshore project
can expect to be directly impacted by these political changes. Changing
political winds may mean that the benefits plans, approved years earlier,
may again come under scrutiny.
Such a question was recently examined by the Supreme Court of
Newfoundland and Labrador (Trial Division) in Hibernia Management
5 9
and Development Company Ltd andPetro-Canadav. C-NLOPB.
As already noted, Section 151.1 of the Newfoundland Accord Act
authorizes the C-NLOPB to issue guidelines and interpretation notes
with respect to the application and administration of the benefits plans
provisions of that Act. Following consultation with the industry, on 5
November 2004, the Board established the Guidelines for Research
and Development Expenditures. 6 These R&D Guidelines outlined the
amounts operators were required to spend on research and development
over the life of their respective projects. They apply to all existing and
future offshore petroleum projects in the area subject to the AccordActs
and came into effect on 1 April 2004. The R&D Guidelines establish
expenditure obligations for project operators during the three recognized
phases of an offshore petroleum project: the exploration phase, the
development phase and the production phase. Hibernia, Terra Nova and
White Rose are all currently in the production phase.
Based on Statistics Canada data, the Board undertook research to
determine the "upstream" research and development expenditures norms
58. Al Hudec & Van Penick, "British Columbia Oil and Gas Law" (2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 101 at
130.
59. Supra note 33.
60. Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Benefits Plan Guidelines, Appendix II: Guidelines for
Research and Development Expenditure, (February 2006), online: Canada Newfoundland and
Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board <http://www.cnlopb.nl.ca/publicat/guidelin/benplan/benplan.
pdf>.

306

The Dalhousie Law Journal

by oil and gas extracting companies in Canada. Using a five-year moving
average, the Board established a percentage of total annual revenue to be.
spent on research and development in the Province. The actual amount of
expenditure in a year depends on the five-year benchmark and the price
of oil.
The Board estimated that the annual costs for these research and
development expenditures would be approximately $3.7 million for each
project. The total cost over the life of each project was estimated by the
Board to be $85 million for Hibernia out of a total of approximately $19
billion in revenue, or .45%; and approximately $62 million for Terra
Nova out of a total revenue of $13 billion, or .48%. Petro-Canada and the
Hibernia Management and Development Company (HMDC) estimated
the cost of these Guidelines to be significantly higher than this in the case
of the Hibernia (approximately $159 million) and slightly higher for Terra
Nova (approximately $68 million). Regardless of whose figures were
used, the cost of the R&D Guidelines will be significant in total dollar
figures over the lives of these projects.
Petro-Canada, as the operator of Terra Nova, and HMDC, as the
operator of Hibernia, submitted that these actions of the Board amounted
to a unilateral amendment of the applicants' benefits plans. The benefit
plans had been previously agreed to by the federal and provincial
governments as part of the project approval process. Petro-Canada and
HMDC believed the Board did not have the authority to amend these
plans. They also submitted that since the Board had already approved the
applicants' benefits plans and development plans it was therefore functus
officio. Further, Petro-Canada and HMDC asserted that they had acquired
vested rights pursuant to the approval process which dated back to the
mid-1980's in the case of Hibernia, and the mid-1990's in the case of Terra
Nova. The R&D Guidelines would deprive them of some of these rights.
They further submitted that the Board had overstepped its authority by
establishing an R&D Fund into which would be placed any unexpended
portion of the R&D expenditure requirements under the Guidelines. The
Fund was to be spent by the Board in consultation with the industry. PetroCanada and HMDC submitted that the Fund amounted to a tax that the
Board had no statutory authority to levy.6
Petro-Canada and HMDC asserted that once the Board approved their
respective benefits plans, that fixed their obligations regarding benefits
for the entire duration of their respective projects. If the Board wished
to establish targets for expenditures on research and development these
61.

Supra note 33 at paras. 3-9.

The Accord Acts Twenty Years Later

should have been fixed at the time of the approvals of the respective
benefits plans and could not now be imposed after the fact. They asserted
that they undertook these expensive, long-term projects with the firm
understanding that the benefits they would be obliged to provide would
be as set out in those plans as approved. They asserted that the Board nio
longer had any authority to impose any additional or different obligations
on them.
The Court rejected this assertion stating:
With respect, I find that this is not a reasonable or purposive
interpretation of the Accord and the Acts and the Board's previous
decisions approving these developments. These offshore developments
have a life spanning decades. The benefits plans themselves proposed
the establishment of general principles and commitments and eschewed
any specific expenditure commitments for research and development
and education and training. They proposed regular reporting by the
operators and ongoing monitoring by the Board to ensure compliance
with the commitments undertaken and that maximum benefits would
flow to the Province in particular and Canada generally.
To adopt the applicants' submissions wouldbe to allow them to unilaterally
determine what amount to spend on research and development and
education and training. They could choose to spend nothing and simply
report that they were spending nothing. This, in their interpretation,
would be the fulfilment of their obligation. As I have already stated, this
is not a reasonable and purposive interpretation of the legislation and the
Board's authority and obligations under the Accord and the Acts.62
The Court noted that the applicants' ability to proceed with their
developments were dependent on Board approval and that by accepting
the Board's approval of their respective benefits plans, the applicants
had accepted that the Board had an ongoing obligation and authority to
assess and monitor the appropriateness of the levels of expenditure on
research, development, and education and training. Having accepted these
approvals on that basis, the Court found it was not open to the applicants
to deny the Board's ability to fulfill its duties under the Newfoundland
Accord, and the NewfoundlandAccord Act.
The Court also rejected thefunctus officio argument. Adams J. noted
that the Board is granted the continuing power to monitor and assess the
appropriateness of the level of expenditures of the applicants on research
and development from time to time throughout the duration of these

62.

Ibid. at paras. 45, 46.
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decades-long projects. He concluded that the principle offunctus officio
63
has no application to continuing powers.
In rejecting the applicants' assertion that their vested rights had been
interfered with, Adams J. stated that:
the benefits plans provided for nothing more than general principles
and commitments respecting research and development. It was left
to the Board to determine from time to time what would amount to an
appropriate and adequate level of expenditure. This could not be and was
not determined at the beginning of the project and this was acknowledged
by the applicants. 64
It is interesting to note that the decision does not articulate how the result
in the case fits with the observations of the Supreme Court of Canada in
the Mobil case on one of the purposes of the AccordActs being to create a
stable and fair offshore management regime for industry. The decision is
currently under appeal.
Industry may well be concerned about the possibility that project
participants may be required to contribute unbudgeted monies in the years
following substantial capital expenditures. If the trial decision stands,
each participant in a producing project could be subject, throughout the
life of the project, to the ability of the Board to retroactively determine
the appropriateness of the expenditures being made by the project
proponents in compliance with their obligations for the duration of the
project, with the result that the proponents cannot predict with certainty
what the expenditures will be. The fact that this is in part the result of
the very general "principles" language used in some of the benefits
plans approved to date (Justice Adams expressly noted that he was not
dealing with specific expenditure commitments in the areas that were the
subjects of the plans before him) suggests new caution in the language
used for benefits plans commitments. No doubt consideration will also be
given to possible means of restricting the Board's ability to require such
additional expenditures in relation to benefits plan commitments. Since
the Boards have the ultimate power to set the benefit plans and administer
their compliance as envisioned by Justice Adams, absent a joint directive
from the relevant province and the federal government, it is difficult to see
how an agreement with the province will have much effect on the Board's
actions. The limitation. will have to come in the form of the commitments
themselves.
63. Ibid. at para. 50 (citing Comeau " Sea Foods Ltd. v. Canada(Ministerof Fisheriesand Oceans),
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 12).
64. Ibid. at para. 52.
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2. Standing to enforce benefits plans
A further issue that has arisen with respect to benefits plans under the
AccordActs is who has standing to enforce the obligations arising pursuant
to the provisions of a benefits plan. As noted above, in City of Saint John '
v. Canada-NewfoundlandOffshore PetroleumBoardthe City of St. John's
tried to enforce a benefit commitment made by Petro-Canada in the Terra
Nova Development Plan even though the city was not a party to the
65
benefits plan.
The Court rejected the. City's application because, in part, the City
did not have the capacity to bring an action to enforce the Benefits Plan.
Noting that a "municipal corporation such as the City of St. John's has
no greater capacity than that given by its incorporating legislation, ' 66 the
Court observed that there was nothing in the City of St. John s Act 67 which
gave the City the legal capacity to bring an action for the general benefit
of its citizens. The Court concluded that the City did not have the capacity
under its incorporating legislation to maintain the proceeding.
In another case, a local manufacturer of containers, A.M.O. Containers
Limited, was not invited to tender on a contract to supply offshore containers
to Hibernia. The company launched a suit naming the Government of
Canada, the Government of Newfoundland, the C-NLOPB, HMDC and
two agent-corporations as defendants.6 8 A.M.O. brought an action in
which it alleged that the Province had breached a legislative scheme that
imposed certain duties on the Province to act in accordance with A.M.O.'s
economic interests. A.M.O. also alleged that the Province was negligent.
The Province responded that the legislation placed no obligation or
duty on the Province to act in order to protect A.M.O.'s interests. 69 The
Province successfully applied to have A.M.O.'s claim struck for disclosing
no reasonable cause of action. The Court found that the Province "owed
no duty to A.M.O. Containers, breached no duty to A.M.O. Containers,
'
and caused A.M.O. containers no loss. 70
Other commentators have suggested that the Boards be given
71
alternatives in enforcing specific commitments in the benefits plans.
Currently, the only remedy the Boards possess is the suspension or

65.
66.

Supra note 37.
Ibid.at para. 40.

67.
68.

R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-17.
A.MO. ContainersLimited v. Canada(A.G.) etal. (1999), 185 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 51 (S.C.T.D.).

69.
70.
71.

Ibid. at paras. 1-10.
Ibid.at para. 48.
Supra note 58 at 133.
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revocation of licences or authorizations. As already noted, this 'heavy
remedy' is clearly insufficient when dealing with matters of this nature.
Finally, there is some debate about the most effective methods by
which to monitor the effectiveness of and adherence to benefits plans.
In the 2005 Report of the Implementation Committee, the Atlantic
Energy Roundtable noted concerns that benefits reporting requirements
were adding to administrative overhead and costs without providing
commensurate advantages to the industry or governments. The challenge
was to identify improvements that would reduce costs while ensuring that
required information remained available to the industry and governments
for planning and monitoring purposes and that the importance of local
benefits remained undiminished.72 Consensus among all stakeholders on
the specific recommendations was not reached.
IV. Poolingand unitization
1. Pooling
Whether located in the Western Canadian sedimentary basin or beneath
the seabed, the oil and gas in a reservoir is migratory by nature. There is
a possibility that a well drilled by one party into a reservoir shared with
adjacent lands held by another party may drain the resource from those
adjacent lands. Drainage issues are as problematic offshore as they are on
land.
The common law deals with drainage through the rule of capture. In
Borys v. CanadianPacific Railway and Imperial Oil Limited the Alberta
Court of Queen's Bench held that the mineral owner acquires title to the
oil and gas produced from wells on his land even though the oil or gas has
migrated from adjoining properties.7 3 This doctrine was recently affirmed
74
by the Supreme Court of Canada.
The only protection against drainage at common law was to drill
an offset well. The early results of the application of this rule were
"development and production practices that failed to maximize ultimate
recovery from reservoirs and that produced massive economic Waste in the
'75
form of unnecessary wells.
To avoid the adverse consequences of drilling more wells than
required to effectively drain a reservoir, most jurisdictions have enacted
conservation legislation and regulations that limit, through well spacing
72.
73.
74.
75.
199.

AER, infra note 119 at 12.
[1953] 2 D.L.R. 65.
See Anderson v. Amoco CanadaOil and Gas, 2004 SCC 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 3.
Alastair Lucas & Constance Hunt, Oil and Gas Law in Canada, (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at
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requirements, drilling density for both drilling and production purposes.
Traditionally, the purposes of such well spacing has been four-fold:
1. to promote conservation of the resource;
2. to protect the correlative rights of well owners;
3.

to reduce the economic waste of drilling more wells than
necessary; and

76
4. to eliminate the safety hazard of closely spaced wells.

Leases of smaller tracts than required by such well spacing requirements
may be the subject of pooling arrangements under which interest holders
may aggregate their interests to the extent sufficient to justify a well. Such
pooling agreements allow interest holders to combine their lands for the
purpose of drilling or producing under existing conservation laws.
In most jurisdictions, a spacing unit is well defined and easily
discernible. In Alberta, for example, the normal spacing unit for an oil well
is 160 acres and the normal spacing unit for a gas well is 640 acres.7 7 When
spacing requirements are imposed upon a system previously governed by
the rule of capture, some mechanism will generally be created to deal
with correlative rights - in this context, the rights of an owner to obtain
an equitable share of production and to be protected from the wasteful
practices of others with rights in a common pool. In Alberta, procedures
exist for the recognition of voluntary pooling arrangements and for forced
pooling where parties cannot agree. The owner of a tract within a drilling
spacing unit may apply to the Energy Resources Conservation Board for
an order that all tracts within the drilling spacing unit be operated as a unit
to permit the drilling for or the production of oil or gas from the spacing
78
unit.
Similarly, under the Accord Acts, all working and royalty interest
holders in a spacing unit may voluntarily pool their interests for the
purpose of drilling for and producing petroleum. 79 The Accord Acts also
allow a working interest holder in a spacing unit to apply to the Board for a
mandatory pooling order directing the working interest and royalty owners

76. See Rowland Harrison, "Regulation of Well Spacing in Oil and Gas Production" (1970) 8 Alta.
L. Rev. 357.
77. Oil and Gas Conservation Act, Oil and Gas Conservation Regulations, Alta. Reg. 151/71, s.
4.020.
78. Oil and Gas ConservationAct, R.S.A. 2000, c. 0-6, s. 80(l).
79. Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 2, s. 172; Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 1, s. 167.
Note: the pooling agreement and any amendments must be filed with the Chief Conservation officer.
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within the spacing unit to pool their interests.8" The Accord Acts prohibit
oil and gas production if there are two or more leases or separately owned
working interests within a single spacing unit.8
One difficulty under the Accord Acts is determining one of the basic
parameters for a pooling agreement. The definition of "spacing unit" under
the AccordActs lacks the specificity of the Alberta definition. Under the
Accord Acts, a "spacing unit" is defined as "the area allocated to a well
for the purpose of drilling for or producing petroleum. 8 2 Thus, the Accord
Acts' definition of a "spacing unit" neither describes precisely the area of
a spacing unit nor indicates how such area is to be ascertained.83
There may be an historical reason for the lack of specificity in this
regard. The pooling sections of the AccordActs are based on the COGOA,
which appears to be the source of the "spacing unit" definition. 4 The
recently circulated draft Drilling and Production Regulations under the
COGOA state:
The Board is authorized to make orders respecting the allocation of
areas, including the determination of the size of spacing units, and the
well production rates for the purposes of drilling for or producing oil
or gas and to exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be
necessary for the management and control of oil or gas production.85
The same clause is currently out for comment with respect to the
Draft Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Drilling and Production
Regulations.8 6
The draft regulations would create in the offshore a regime similar to
that which currently obtains in Alberta. They state that they are similarly
intended to "promote conservation, prevent the waste of oil and gas
resources and to protect correlative rights. 8 7 The draft regulations impose

80. Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 2, s. 173(1); Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 1, s.
168(1).
81. Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 2, s. 176(l); Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 1,s.
171(l).
82. Nova Scotia AccordAct, supra note 2, s. 171; Newfoundland Accord Act, supranote 1, s.166.
83. Richard A. Neufeld & Robert G. Grant, Q.C., "Drainage Issues in the Atlantic Canada Offshore
Petroleum Industry" (2001) 24 Dal. L.J. 127 at 134.
84. Supra note 52, s. 29.
85. Draft Canada Oil and Gas Drilling and Production Regulations (5 April 2007), online: The
National Energy Board <https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/lf-nsi/rpblctnlctsndrgltn/COGOA/20070405Dr
aftCOGDPR e,oef>.
86. Draft Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulations, online: The
National Energy Board <https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/lcf-nsi/rpblctn/ctsndrgltn/COGOA/20070405Dr
aftNewfoundlandopdpr e.pdt>.
87. See National Energy Board Press Release, online: The National Energy Board
<http://www.one.gc.ca/ActsRegulations/COGOA/20070405WellSpacinge.pdf'>.
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a standard grid, indicating well spacing units, target areas and penalty
formulas to be applied if a well is drilled off target.
The incorporation of such regulations would allow the Boards to
develop a consistent and easily identifiable spacing unit, allowing for
predictability and better protection of correlative rights.
2. Unitization
Related to the concept of pooling is unitization. While pooling involves
the bringing together of small tracts sufficient for the granting of a well
permit under applicable spacing rules, unitization involves the joint
operation of a producing reservoir where there is separate ownership of
rights in relation to it."5 Unitization is a useful conservation tool. Through
unitization, producers can make efficient use of reservoir pressures and
secondary recovery operations can be used at the appropriate early stage
.in the development of the resource. Only with unitization of fairly sizeable
tracts is it economically feasible to use advanced methods of cycling for
maximum extraction of liquid constituents from gas. Under a unitization
program, input and production wells may be located in accordance with the
best engineering practices and without regard to lease, interest or spacing
unit boundaries.89
The Accord Acts permit unitization where there are several working
interest holders in all or part of a pool that exceeds the area of a spacing
unit. Unitization may occur under the Accord Acts in three ways. First,
one or more working interest owners in a pool or part of a pool exceeding
in area a spacing unit, together with the royalty owners in respect of that
pool, may voluntarily enter into a unit agreement and operate their interests
under the terms of the unit agreement or an amendment to it where a
copy of the agreement and an amendment have been filed with the Chief
90
Conservation Officer.
In the case of Terra Nova, the field was comprised of five significant
discovery licences with varying ownerships. In C-NLOPB Decision
97.02 in which the Board approved the development plan for the Terra
Nova Development Project, the Board required a unitization agreement
which, although it was being negotiated, was necessary for "conservation
purposes":
The Board acknowledges the unitization efforts by the Proponent
88.
89.

See Lucas & Hunt, supra note 75 for a more fulsome discussion of the principles ofunitization.
See Bruce Kramer & Patrick Martin, The Law ofPooling and Unitization(LexisNexis: Matthew

Bender, 1989).
90. Nova Scotia Accord-Act, supra note 2, s. 177(1); Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 1, s.
172(1).
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and believes that unitization of the field is important for conservation
purposes and for effective administration of the regulations governing
production of the resource. Therefore, it is a condition of the Board's
approval that:
Condition 15:
The Proponent file with the Board a unit agreement and a unit operating
agreement prior to initiating oil production. 9'
In this case, the Board made a voluntary agreement a condition of the
Board's approval.
Second, where, in the opinion of the Chief Conservation
Officer of
the relevant Board, the unit operation of a pool or part thereof would
prevent waste, the Chief Conservation Officer may apply to the Oil and
Gas Committee for an order requiring the working interest owners in the
pool or part thereof to enter into a unit agreement and a unit operating
92
agreement in respect of the pool or part thereof.
The AccordActs define "waste" as follows:
(2) In this Part, "waste", in addition to its ordinary meaning, means waste
as understood in the petroleum industry and in particular, but without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes
(a) the inefficient or excessive use or dissipation of reservoir energy;
(b) the locating, spacing or drilling of a well within a field or pool or
within part of a field or pool or the operating of any well that, having
regard to sound;
(c) engineering and economic principles, results or tends to result in a
reduction in the quantity of petroleum ultimately recoverable from a
pool;
(d) the drilling, equipping, completing, operating or producing of any
well in a manner that causes or is likely to cause the unnecessary or
excessive loss or destruction of petroleum after removal from the
reservoir;
(e) the inefficient storage of petroleum above ground or underground;
(f) the production of petroleum in excess of available storage,
transportation or marketing facilities;
(g) the escape or flaring of gas that could be economically recovered and
processed or economically injected into an underground reservoir;
91. Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Development Board 1997, Decision 97.02, supra note 27.
92. Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 2, s. 178(1); Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 1, s.
173(1).
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or

(h) the failure to use suitable artificial, secondary or supplementary
recovery methods in a pool whenit appears that such methods would
result in increasing the quantity of petroleum ultimately recoverable
under sound engineering and economic principles.93
In the third category of unitization under the Accord Acts, the. relevant
Board may refer to the Committee an application for a unitization order by
one or more working interest owners who are parties to a unit agreement
and a unit operating agreement and own in the aggregate sixty-five per cent
or more of the working interests in a unit area.94 The Committee is required
to hold a hearing at which all interested persons have an opportunity to be
heard and, if the unitization order would accomplish the more efficient or
more economical production of petroleum from the unitized zone (and the
other requirements of the AccordAct are met), the Committee may order
that the unit agreement be binding on all working interest and royalty
owners in the unit area and that the unit operating agreement be binding
on all working interest holders in the unit area. Under the COGOA, the
NEB has no such jurisdiction.95 If there is no waste, the NEB and the Chief
Conservation Officer appointed by the NEB cannot compel unitization.
Despite the ability of the Boards to require unitization agreements
on this additional ground, the Accord Acts do not indicate that the Board
should consider questions of equity and fairness between the parties when
determining whether or not to issue a mandatory unitization order.
3. Special spacing units
Since normal drilling spacing units (DSUs) are not always appropriate
to all reservoirs, most jurisdictions provide regulators with the ability to
vary the size and configuration of DSUs.96 As previously noted, a spacing
unit under the AccordActs is a malleable concept, essentially delimited by
what the relevant Board determines it to be. This too may change if draft
regulations are implemented.

93. Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 1, s. 154(2), Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 2, s.
159(2).
94. Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 2, s. 179(1); Newf6indland Accord Act, supra note 1, s.
174(1).
95. Sections 39 through 47 of the COGOA, supra note 52, would allow the NEB to issue a
unitization order if one or more working interest owners who are parties to a unit agreement and a unit
operating agreement and own in the aggregate sixty-five per cent or more of the working interests in
a unit area may applied for a unitization order with respect to the agreements. These sections remain
unproclaimed.
96. See e.g., Oil and Gas Conservation Regulations,Alta. Reg. 151/1971, s. 4.040(3).
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The draft COGOA D&P Regulations also contain a provision allowing
the NEB to vary the area assigned to a spacing unit or target area:
9. The Board may vary the area assigned to a spacing unit or the size or
shape of the target area if the Board is satisfied that:
(a) improved recovery will be obtained,
(b) additional wells are necessary to provide capacity to drain the pool
at a rate that will not adversely affect the recovery from the pool,
(c) increased deliverability from a gas field is desirable,
(d) there is common ownership,
(e) recovery will be improved while not affecting the recovery of
adjacent rights holders, or
(f) it is deemed necessary by the Board for the management or control
97
of oil or gas production.
Importing a substantially similar clause into the Accord Acts would allow
the Boards to maintain flexibility in offshore development, while dealing
with issues of waste and correlative rights.
Because of the undefined nature of a spacing unit under the Accord
Acts, it is not surprising that there are no applications to date for a special
spacing unit. If the draft regulations are enacted, however, we may see
special spacing unit applications in the future.
V. Thirdpartyaccess to facilities
A common concern in some parts of the oil and gas industry is that
restricted, or unreasonable terms of, access of third parties to facilities
may hamper development of offshore resources.
In Alberta, regulatory aspects of gas processing facilities, including
the negotiation of processing terms between plant owners and third party
producers and the construction of new facilities, are administered by the
AEUB. The regulations reflect a policy of the Alberta government to
avoid unnecessary duplication of facilities having regard to environmental
and resource conservation concerns while at the same time providing for
competitive development of the oil and gas industry. To ensure access to
a facility for producers who do not have an interest in it, the AEUB may
declare it to be a common facility. This means that facility owners or
Request for comment relating to Draft Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Drilling and
ProductionRegulations (5 April 2007), online: The National Energy Board <http://www.one.gc.ca/
clf-nsi/rpblctn/tsndragltn/COGOA/20070405WellSpacing_3.pd f>.
97.
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operators cannot discriminate in favour of one producer or owner of gas
as against another in a particular gas pool, discriminate in favour of the
owner's own gas, or charge unreasonable prices for third party access.
The AEUB may, as part of the common processor procedure:
* regulate the total amount of gas to be processed from a particular
pool;
* regulate the proportion of production capacity to be allocated to
each owner or producer in a pool; and
* where the common processor and a person seeking to have its
gas processed at the common processor's facility cannot agree on
price, the AEUB may fix a fair and reasonable price to be paid.
The availability of the common processor procedure and the potential
for the AEUB to establish rates acts as a deterrent to the raising of rates
or other exercises of market power by processors. Added to this is the fact
that most producers must, at some point, seek access to other producers'
facilities, and so are inclined to be reasonable in the terms they set.
Under the Accord Acts, the terms of an operating licence or
authorization for a facility used in the production, conservation, processing
or transportation of petroleum in the offshore area, or the development
plan approval for the overall development project itself, may include
terms requiring that third party access to the relevant facilities, where
excess capacity exists, be on reasonable terms and conditions. 98 The
AccordActs themselves do not contain anything equivalent to the Alberta
common processor provisions and again the Board would be faced with
adding provisions for dealing with such matters in the form of conditions
of authorizations or approvals the Board is empowered to give under the
AccordActs with respect to the project or facility in question. 99
A condition of the C-NSOPB approval for the Sable Offshore Energy
Project (SOEP), for example, required third party access on "reasonable
terms and conditions" which would allow the C-NSOPB, in the event of
a dispute, to:
.

determine if third party access is to be provided,

98. Newfoundland Accord Act, ss. 138 (operating licences and authorizations for work) and 139
(development plan approval); Nova Scotia AccordAct, ss.142 (operating. licences and authorizations
for work) and 143 (development plan approval).
99. Ibid.
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specify the proportion of production to be taken by the proponents,
and
set pipeline tariffs and processing fees, and fix the delivery
location.
In the case of the Hibernia Project, the proponents recognized from the
outset the importance of facilities and logistics sharing. As stated on the
project's website:l°0
When Hibernia began construction in 1991, Newfoundland was a
'greenfield' site in petroleum industry terms, with very little supporting
infrastructure in place. Hibernia has changed all that, through the
development of:
shorebase facilities
warehousing complex
heliport
transshipment terminal
training simulator
Much of this infrastructure can be utilized by future oil developments and
will form the foundation for an east coast offshore oil and gas industry.
By utilizing the "shared services" approach to industry support, there
is the potential for considerable cost savings for all petroleum industry
participants - Hibernia included. In fact, the Terra Nova development
is already utilizing the heliport, warehouse and shorebase facilities
developed for Hibernia, resulting in significant cost reductions for all
parties.
One method of obtaining access to third party facilities is by contractual
arrangements with the operator of the facilities. In the Gulf of Mexico,
for example, much of the recent field development activity has to do with
facilities and platform use and construction and there has been a trend
of operators specifically designing development structures with sufficient
excess capacity to handle future third party production. 101
In offshore Atlantic Canada, certain participants in the Hibernia and
Terra Nova projects have entered into contractual arrangements with
100. Hibernia, online: <www.hibemia.ca/index2.html>.
101. R. Thomas Jordan, Jr., "The APPL's Work Toward a New Model Form Shelf Operating
Agreement" (Paper presented to the South Texas College of Law Energy Law Institute, Houston,
Texas, 16 August 2002), CD-ROM: Mineral Law Series Volume 2002, Number 3.
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respect to the use of marine tankers and storage facilities by both projects
and of course the services of the Newfoundland Transshipment Limited
(NTL) terminal and facilities at Whiffenhead are available to persons
who enter into a reserved capacity service agreement with NTL. It is no
doubt helpful that these projects and facilities have a number of common
participants.
The Sable Offshore Energy Project began production in late 1999
and today is producing from five gas fields. A number of undeveloped
discoveries in the Nova Scotia offshore are close enough to the SOEP
infrastructure to be technically capable of being tied back to this
infrastructure.0 2 They remain undeveloped because the parties holding
interests that are the subject of these discoveries have yet to consider them
economically viable.
While the C-NSOPB has expressed the view that the prospects for
further gas developments in the Sable Island area are good, interest in
exploring this area has been low in recent years with most explorers
focussed on deepwater or carbonate plank opportunities. Like certain
areas of the North Sea, Sable Island is now a mature area and its remaining
potential may involve smaller discoveries. Interest owners discovering
resources in the area must access third party infrastructure in order to make
their projects viable. One view is that any new discovery in the Sable
Island area, other than a major discovery, would have to use the SOEP
infrastructure, including the onshore gas plant and fractionation facility, in
order to be commercially viable.
In the case of Deep Panuke, the proponent sought regulatory approval
for each of two configurations, one being a parallel pipeline to shore and
the second a "hot tap" tie-in to the SOEP infrastructure. The justification
advanced to the C-NSOPB/NEB review panel as to the need to evaluate
both options was that the most economic of the two alternatives was not
yet apparent (chiefly, but not exclusively, comparing construction to tariffs,
rather than capacity constraints, in light of SOEP production declines).
Similar considerations apply to other areas offshore Atlanta Canada
where interests relate to or overlap common reservoirs.
This is not a problem unique to the Canadian offshore. Throughout the
North Sea there is potential for commercial tension between the owners
of infrastructure and the owners of third party fields seeking access to that
infrastructure. The U.K. has addressed this issue through both voluntary
and compulsory legal frameworks for commercial arrangements for third
102. Brenton Smith, "Opportunities Offshore Nova Scotia," (Presentation to the Small Field
Development Workshop of the CNSOPB, 28 March 2007).
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party access. If requested by a would-be user, the Secretary of State has
powers, having considered the interests of all parties, to impose a solution
to problems of pipeline sizing, connections or tariffs. However, these
powers have not to date been exercised. 10 3
Similarly, the Australian Natioial Third Party Access Code for
Natural Gas Pipeline Systems1 4 establishes a transparent regulatory
process to set access terms and conditions for both transmission and.
distribution pipelines. The Code also contains rules which establish
which of these pipelines ought to be made subject to the Code's third party
access provisions. Proposed reforms include a move to a "light-handed"
regulatory approach consisting of price monitoring and the prospect of
binding arbitration should a commercial arrangement appear unlikely.15
Norway's Petroleum Act'016 and the Petroleum Regulation10 7 also
establish a third-party access regime upon demonstration of "reasonable
need" (i.e., producing or trading in natural gas), subject to nondiscriminatory conditions. Gassco, the statutory "independent system
operator" oversees the access regime, which consists of rounds of spare
108
capacity booking and a distribution formula.
As the industry continues to expand in the east coast offshore
and
fields mature and decline, access of third parties to facilities will becQme
increasingly important. The experience to date has been generally positive,
driven by economic exigencies, co-operative arrangements among
producers and best development considerations rather than a desire to
control or dominate aspects of facilities' usage. The "sharing" approach
evidenced from the beginning of the Hibernia Project may be tested in
the future with respect to different operator and project configurations
and it will be interesting to see how the Boards are able to influence the
resolution of disputes among commercial parties given the differences
between the powers available to regulators such as the AEUB and what
the Boards possess under the AccordActs.

103. Field Development Guidelines, online: UK Oil Portal <http://www.og.dti.gov.uk/upstrean
infrastructure/index.htm>.
104. National Third PartyAccess Codefor NaturalGas PipelineSystems 1998 (W.A.) Similar to the
AccordActs, the "Code" is implemented in each Australian State and Territory by local legislation.
105. 2007 Offshore Acreage Release, Overview for Applicants, Gas Access Regulation in Australia,

online: <http://www.mce.gov.au>.
106. Act 1996-11-29 no. 72 (Nor.).
107. Regulations to Act Relating to Petroleum Activities (Royal Decree, 27 June 1997, last amended

22 December 2006) (Nor.).
108. See Gassco Capacity Management, online: Gassco <www.gassco.no/SW3092.asp>.
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VI. Productionflow testing
At the time the AccordActs were initially enacted, the subsurface geology
of the Scotian shelf and the Grand Banks was largely unknown. The
Hebron, Ben Nevis, West Ben Nevis, Terra Nova and White Rose fields
were relatively recent discoveries./° The offshore petroleum drilling
regulations that had been enacted were, in part, to assist in identifying the
nature and scope of the offshore resources claimed by both the provinces
and the federal government. They reflected the technology of the times.
For example, when they were enacted, the Offshore Petroleum Drilling
Newfoundland andLabradorRegulations under the NewfoundlandAccord
Act stated:
170. (1) Subject to subsection 170(2), every operator shall ensure that
every formation in a well is sampled or tested to obtain fluid flow and
reservoir pressure data from the formation where there is an indication
that the result of such a sample or test will contribute substantially to the
evaluation of the formation.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), every operator shall ensure that a
formation flow test is conducted if fluid samples and productivity data
are required and wireline formation samples do not provide sufficient
information for the evaluation of the formation.l10
The flow testing regulations enacted under the Accord Acts mirrored the
language found in s. 196(1) and (2) of the Canada Oil and Gas Drilling
Regulations"' under the COGOA. The COGOA has been described as a
largely prescriptive regime that specifies "what was to be done... how it
was to be done, what would be inspected, and when it would be inspected,
and who would conduct the inspection."' 2 As the COGOA is the basis
for this aspect of the Accord Acts, it is not surprising that the initial
109. Hebron was discovered in 1981; Ben Nevis was discovered in 1980; White Rose was discovered
in 1984; West Ben Nevis was discovered in 1985; Terra Nova was discovered in 1984. For a timeline
of offshore development in Newfoundland and Labrador, see Key Events Chronology 1999 - 1812
online: Government of Newfoundland and Labrador <http://www.nr.gov.nl.ca/mines&en/industry/
milestones.pdf>.
110. Offshore Petroleum Drilling Newifoundland and Labrador Regulations, Nfld. Reg. 748/96.,
s.170; Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum DrillingRegulations, N.S. Reg. 137/92, s. 171. It is
understood that the practice of the Board under the Newfoundland and Labrador regulations has been
to waive the requirement for a production flow test on exploration wells.
11. S.O.R./79-82.
112. Rob Grant, Q.C., Will Moreira, Q.C., & David Henley, "Potential for Performance-Based
Regulation in the Canadian Offshore Oil and Gas Industry" (2006), 44 Alta. L. Rev. 1 at 3 (citing
Kenneth W. Vollman, "Towards Goal-Oriented Regulation" (Paper presented at the International
Pipeline Conference, Ottawa, 4 October 2000) [unpublished], online: The National Energy Board
<www.neb-one.gc.ca/newsroom/Speeches/2000/KWVGoalOrientedRegulationIPC2000 10_04_e.
htm>).
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provisions of the AccordActs in this area are largely prescriptive by nature
(despite the inconsistency of this approach with the purpose and intent of
the AccordActs, as articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mobil).
The difficulty with a prescriptive regime is that where the provisions are
out of date, regulatory requirements can present barriers to the use of new
and innovative technologies, and can create unnecessary costs for industry
and regulators.
These regulations had the effect of removing much of an operator's
discretion as to the necessity and economics of flow testing each
exploratory well encountering hydrocarbons. For example, the Joint
Guidelines Respecting Data Acquisition and Reporting For Well, Pool and
Field Evaluations in the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia Offshore Areas
stated that the "Board requires that the operator conduct a formation flow
test where hydrocarbons are encountered within a sufficient thickness
of porous and permeable reservoir rock for the purpose of acquiring
representative fluid samples and pressure data to determine the in situ flow
characteristics of the reservoir."'' 3 It is understood that these guidelines
have been treated by the Board as equivalent to regulations, rather than
just one way to achieve the test objective, and some view this as having
made the testing requirements even more rigid than what would seem
to be required under the Accord Act. Wherever operators encountered a
hydrocarbon formation with sufficient pressure and size to complete a
flow test, they were expected to complete such flow test based on these
guidelines.
A flow test allows the hydrocarbons in a specific section of the rock
4
to flow into the well bore and up the drill pipe towards the surface."
Fluctuations of the pressure in the reservoir as it depletes permit the
reservoir engineer to determine the type of fluid in the reservoir,
reservoir parameters such as permeability, connectivity, communication,
compartmentalization, etc., and, in many cases, the areal extent of the
hydrocarbon accumulation. This information is critical in determining the
size of the oil or gas accumulation and the rate at which it can be produced.
At the time the AccordActs were enacted, a flow test was the only method
by which such information could be reliably gathered.
The flow test itself requires the use of specialized equipment that must
be attached to the bottom of the drill pipe and lowered into the well to the

113. Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board / Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum
Board, online: <http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/regulatory/pdf/JGDARFINALJune.pdf> at 13.
114. For amore in-depth discussion of the technical aspects of flow testing, see RegulationsAmending
the Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum DrillingRegulations, C. Gaz. 2006.1.832.
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desired depth. The particulars of a flow test are dependent upon many
things, including the type of rock to be tested, the depth, and potential
reservoir pressures and temperatures. Depending on the complexity of
the well bore and the reservoir, designing a test represents a significant
investment of time and capital. It is not unusual for an operator to plan for
three to four months prior to undertaking a flow test on a standard offshore
well. A deepwater or high-pressure well can require more than a year of
planning.
A flow test may take more than thirty days to conduct. Workers must
remove the drill pipe from the well bore, install and perforate a production
liner, attach and calibrate testing tools, and put the drill pipe back down the
hole. The zone to be tested is allowed to flow for a minimum of 8 hours
and then closed in to allow reservoir pressure to re-build. This process
may be repeated several times. During the period, the operator will be
responsible for the cost of the floating platforms and any other vessels
required to store and transport hydrocarbons the test may produce, as well
as the consequence of any inadvertent spills during flaring operations.
As operations move into more complex and technically challenging
areas, 1 5 costs associated with flow tests become so high that mandatory
flow test requirements may actually reduce or inhibit exploration activity.
The estimated cost of conducting an offshore formation flow test ranges
from $10 million to $30 million, depending on the type of rig, water
depth, and reservoir depth. This is a significant expense and often simply
serves to increase costs when the test fails to demonstrate hydrocarbons
in commercially viable amounts. Exploring for oil and gas in a subsea
environment is an expensive and 'high risk' (in the commercial sense)
business. The chance of finding hydrocarbons, even after seismic work
has been completed, is in the range of one in ten. Finding resources in
commercial quantities is even less likely." 6 Accordingly, offshore industry
participants have long believed that the decision to conduct a flow test
should be at the discretion of the operator, based on its assessment of the
7
overall risks and benefits. "

115. As the offshore industry matures, exploration activities are moving from the Laurentian Shelf
and Scotian Shelf into much deeper water. The Terra Nova field lies in roughly 100 metres of water.
Current exploration is taking place at depths of greater than 1,000 metres.
116. Erlandson Consulting Inc. and Petroleum Research Atlantic Canada, "Oil and Gas Approvals
in Atlantic Canada, A guide to regulatory approval processes for oil and natural gas exploration and
production in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area" (January 2004), at 1-2, online: Oil and
Gas Guides <http://www.oilandgasguides.com/guides/ac-nfoa/nfcover.pdf>.
117. Supra note 114.
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The twenty years since the enactment of the Accord Acts have
brought substantial technological advances in well testing. Basic well
information may be obtained through mud logging, logging while drilling
and wireline testing. In a wireline test, equipment is lowered into a well
on a wire, allowing for a small fluid sample to be taken. The test also
provides a reading of the reservoir pressure. It is a much quicker and less
costly procedure than flow testing but still provides useful basic reservoir
information. Although the test is not at all novel, advances in technology
have enabled wireline testing to gather more complete and accurate data
than at the time the Accord Acts were enacted.
The most definitive way to test the production potential of a well is still
to conduct a flow test. Accordingly, legislation requires that an operator
undertake a comprehensive flow test in order to obtain a declaration of
significant discovery, without which further development is prohibited." 8
Production flow tests are an example of the challenges of adapting
legislation to reflect changes in technology. In 2005, the Atlantic Energy
Roundtable (AER) recognized that "Canada's regulations for the offshore
industry would benefit from updating and modernizing."11 9
Performance-based regulation (smart, or goal-oriented regulation, as
discussed previously in Section II and later in Section IX), establishes
"standards which specify measurable outcomes or performance goals,
leaving the means of achieving those outcomes or goals largely to the
discretion of the regulated firm or entity.' 20 Underlying this theory is
the idea that operators are in a better position to understand and employ
economically-sound new technologies than are government agencies.

118. Section 47(n) of the NewfoundlandAccordActstates: . significant discovery" means a discovery
indicated by the Ist well on a geological feature that demonstrates by flow testing the existence of
hydrocarbons in that feature and, having regard to geological and engineering factors, suggests the
existence of an accumulation of hydrocarbons that has potential for sustained production." [emphasis
added]
119. Atlantic Energy Roundtable, Report of the Implementation Committee, (19 February 2005)
online: Natural Resources Canada <http://www.nrcan-mcan.gc.ca/media/reports/2005/FINAL-AERReport-EN.pdf> at 10 [AER].
120. Supra note 112, citing Cary Coglianese, Jennifer Nash & Todd Olmstead, Regulatory Policy
Program Report No. RPP-03, "Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in Health,
Safety, and Environmental Protection" (2002), online: John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University <www.ksg. harvard.edu/cbg/research/rpp/reports/RPPREPORT3.pdf> at 1.
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There has been some movement, particularly in the Canadian offshore,
towards performance-based regulation.12"' In 2005, after research to identify
international and national practice, including the NEB's experience with
goal-oriented regulation, AER participants encouraged governments to
establish a plan to renew the offshore regulations.
In the past two years, draft offshore drilling regulations in both Nova
Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador have been circulated, apparently
with a view to granting greater discretion to operators on formation
testing. 22 The draft regulations state:
56. The operator shall ensure that every formation in a well is tested
and sampled in a manner to obtain reservoir pressure data and fluid
samples from the formation, if there is an indication that such data or
samples would
contribute substantially to the geological and reservoir
23
evaluation. 1

The broader wording in the draft regulations has removed the prescriptive
instruction in its predecessor as to when an operator must conduct a
formation flow test. The new provisions would appear to give an operator
more discretion to decide what testing is required; however, past experience
has shown that the regulations are further supplemented by guidelines and
guidance notes that may increase the prescriptiveness of the regulations.
The revised guidelines associated with the drilling regulations have not
yet been circulated and are needed to determine if greater discretion will
in fact be achieved under the new regulations.
This seeming change in the flow testing requirements would be
consistent with the intention of updating the regulations and moving
towards a performance based regulation. Whereas industry participants
have previously been instructed to flow test every exploration well as a
method of reservoir evaluation, such participants will likely be granted
121. The Report of the Implementation Committee, supranote 119, indicates the following schedules
for implementation of the updated regulatory framework: Diving, September 2005; Submerged
Pipelines, end 2006; Drilling regulation amendment (well costs), 2005; Drilling and Production,
end 2006; Geophysical, 2006 (start 2005); Installations/Certificate of Fitness, 2008 (start 2006);
Occupational Health and Safety, 2009 (start 2006). To date, none of these regulations have been fully
implemented. See also supranote 49.
122. The flow test portion of the draft regulation reflects the current state of the flow test regulations
under the AccordActs following amendments in 2006. The flow test portion of the existing regulations
was amended in 2006 by N.L.R. 102/06 in Newfoundland and Labrador and by N.S. Reg. 165/2006 in
Nova Scotia.
123. Draft Newfoundland Offshore Drilling and Production Regulations, 5 April 2007, online:
<http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-nsi/rpblctn/ctsndrgltn/COGOA/20070405DraftNewfoundland
OPDPR e.pdf>. Identical provisions are found in the Draft Nova Scotia Offshore Drilling and
Production Regulations, online: <http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-nsi/rpblctn/ctsndrgltn/COGOA/
20070405DraftNovaScotiaOPDPR e.pdf>.
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more discretion in their work, only requiring the expensive and time
consuming flow tests prior to being issued a significant discovery license.
Hopefully the wording of the requirements, in conjunction with relevant
guidelines, will be consistent with this approach.
VII. Private royalty agreements
A private royalty agreement is a project specific royalty arrangement
between a provincial government and the project proponents that is entered
into by the parties to it as a binding contractual commitment. 12 4 Prior to
1997, private royalty agreements were entered into between the Alberta
government and parties holding oil sands interests, but that practice
was replaced in 1997 with a generic oil sands royalty." 5 Both Accord
Act regimes provide for private royalty agreements in the provincial oil
and gas legislation that is used to authorize the regulations that impose
the royalty under the respective Accord Act. 126 There are currently four
sets of private royalty agreements in relation to offshore Atlantic Canada:
Hibernia in Newfoundland and Labrador, Sable Island (where there are
actually five separate royalty agreements regarding the Sable Offshore
Energy Project127 ), Deep Panuke and Cohasset in Nova Scotia. There
were extensive negotiations on a private royalty agreement for Terra Nova
but this was superseded by a royalty imposed by regulations enacted by
28
Newfoundland and Labrador.
At least one commentator has suggested that provincial royalty
agreements will continue to be required, given the risks, conservative
approach, pro-govemmerft nature and limited scope of a generic royalty
regime, and the need for proponents of major developments to have
particular issues and risks dealt with in a binding way outside the generic
regime. 29 Confirmation of this view is evidenced by the fact that Nova
Scotia has implemented, as part of its public policy, an Energy Strategy,
one of the features of which is Offshore Strategic Agreements to be entered
into by the Province with proponents of offshore project developments to
reflect the Province's expectations in developing the offshore in light of
124. Supra note 58. For a thoughtful and provocative discussion of the subject of royalty agreements
for East Coast offshore oil and gas, see Alan T. Pettie, "Are Royalty Agreements Required for Canada
East Coast Offshore Oil and Gas?" (2001) 24 Dal. L.J. 151.
125. There, are still some private royalty agreements extant in the Alberta oil sands but it is very
difficult to obtain information about these.
126. For a discussion of the legislative framework in Hibernia see R.J. Thrasher, "Newfoundland
Generic Royalty Regime" (2003) 26 Dal. L.J. 365 at 4; see also, Pettie, supranote 124 at 192 for a
discussion of the Nova Scotia legislative framework.
127. See Pettie, s pra note 124 at note 130.
128. See Thrasher, supranote 126 at 367-71.
129. See Pettie, supra note 124 at 196-97 and at 212-13.
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market conditions facing proposed developments. 3 ' The Deep Panuke
Offshore Strategic Energy Agreement between EnCana and the Province
is a recent example of such an agreement. 3 ' The OSEA sets forth, among
other things, EnCana's royalty and benefit commitments in respect of
the project and includes the following provision in respect of the royalty
commitments of the Province:
4.2 Amendments made to the Regulations after the date ofthis Agreement
will not affect the provisions described herein or the royalties payable
by EnCana, or the calculation thereof, or any amounts provided for in
this Agreement, subject to the ability of the Minister to enact technical
amendments to the Regulations (not relating to market conditions or
prices) to close loopholes that are contrary to the combined intent of
the provisions of this Agreement and the Regulations13 2and result in the
royalty payable by EnCana being materially reduced.
The advantage of a provision such as this in a royalty agreement with a
province is that, unlike the situation with benefit plans, the provinces do
in fact have the authority under the Accord Acts to set the terms of the
royalties applicable to projects in the relevant offshore areas.
One of the peculiar characteristics of a contract with a provincial
government (or indeed the federal government) in Canada arises from the
doctrine that the power of Parliament and of the provincial legislatures to
legislate cannot be fettered by contract. This doctrine was confirmed by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re: CanadaAssistance Plan
(B.C.)."' In that case, it was argued that because of a prior agreement
with the Province of British Columbia, the Government of Canada was
precluded from introducing into Parliament certain amendments to the
Canada Assistance Plan,3 4 unless they were consented to by the B.C.
provincial government. The prior agreement with the Province, it was
alleged, gave rise to a legitimate expectation that changes to the federal
Act which operated to the disadvantage of British Columbia would not be
introduced without prior consent by the Government of that Province.
In rejecting this argument, Sopinka J., writing for the Court, adopted
the following statement from an Australian Court:
Ministers of State cannot, however, by means of contractual obligations
entered into on behalf of the State fetter their own freedom, or the freedom
130. Online: www.gov.ns.ca/news/details.asp?:d=20011212008.
131. Offshore Strategic Energy Agreement, s. 4.2 (June 2006), online: Department of Energy
<http://www.gov.ns.ca/energy/AbsPage.aspx?id=1555&siteid = l&lang=l1>.
132. Ibid.
133. Reference re: CanadaAssistance Plan, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, (1991), 83 D.L.R (4') 297.
134. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-I.
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of their successors or the freedom of other members of Parliament, to
propose, consider and, if they think fit, vote for laws, even laws which
are inconsistent with the contractual obligations.
Sopinka J. went on to add that a restraint on the power of the executive to
introduce legislation into Parliament would be a fetter on the sovereignty
of Parliament itself.135 The doctrine stated in Reference re: Canada
Assistance Plan appears to apply to the provincial legislatures as well as
to Parliament.'36
The ability of a Canadian federal or provincial government to
unilaterally alter the terms of a contract with another party, however, does
not mean the party is without remedy. There remains an issue as to whether
the government that is party to the contract may be liable for damages for
breach of contract in such circumstances. Holding the government liable
for such damages arguably does not fetter legislative sovereignty, as it
does not constrain the power of the government to legislate.
Arecent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada suggests that a federal
or provincial government may be held liable fori damages if it breached a
private contract. In Wells v. Newfoundland the plaintiff had been appointed
by the Government of Newfoundland as a member of the Public Utilities
Board to hold office to the age of seventy during good behaviour. 31 7 These
terms were in accordance with the legislation then in force. Four years
later, the Government enacted new legislation, restructuring the Board
and abolishing the plaintiff's position. The plaintiff brought an action for
damages for breach of a contract of employment with the Crown. The
plaintiff's claim was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court
concluded that the plaintiff's terms of appointment constituted a contract
of employment with the Crown, and that this contract had been breached
by the Government's abolition of the plaintiff's position. The fact that the
breach of contract had been brought about by legislation did not excuse
the Government from liability for damages in the absence of an express
provision in the legislation insulating the Crown from such liability. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court stated:
there is no question that the Government of Newfoundland had the
authority to restructure or eliminate the Board. There is a crucial
distinction, however, between the Crown legislatively avoiding a

135. Supra note 133 at para. 65, citing West Lakes Ltd. v. South Australia (1980), 25 S.A.S.R. 389 at
390 (Supreme Court of South Australia).
136. Peter W. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada,vol. 1 (Toronto: Carswell, 2005) at 12:7-8; Peter
W. Hogg & Patrick J. Monahan, Liability of the Crown, 31ded., (Toronto: Carswell 2000) at 233-23 6.
137. [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199, (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4-) 73 [Wells].
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contract and altogether escaping the legal consequences of doing so.
While the legislature may have the extraordinary power of passing a law
to specifically deny compensation to an aggrieved individual with whom
it has broken an agreement, clear and explicit statutory language would
be required to extinguish rights previously conferred on that party.
In a nation governed by the rule of law, we assume that the government
will honour its obligations unless it explicitly exercises its power not to.
In the absence of a clear express intent to abrogate rights and obligations
- rights of the highest importance to the individual - those rights remain
in force. To argue the opposite is to say that the government is bound
only by its whim, not its word. In Canada this is unacceptable, and does
not accord with the nation's understanding of the relationship between
the state and its citizens.
Reilly should be taken as turning on the interpretation given to the specific
statute of abolition. To the extent it is relied upon for the proposition that
the Crown can implicitly avoid its contractual obligations by indirectly
legislating a breach, it is no longer the law in Canada.'38
The Hibernia experience has demonstrated how the parties to a private
royalty agreement under one of the Accord Acts have handled issues
arising under the agreement. Taking more than two years to negotiate,
the Hibernia royalty agreement represented a significant commitment of
resources on the part of both the proponents and the province.
On 17 February 2000, the C-NLOPB approved a request from Hibernia
Management and Development Corporation (HMDC), the operator of
Hibernia, to increase the facility maximum daily production rate from the
previous limit of 150,000 barrels a day to 180,000 barrels a day immediately,
and to further increase it to 200,000 barrels a day following the completion
and testing of equipment modifications in March of that year. The HMDC
proposal also sought an increase in the annual production limit from
the then-current level of 50 million barrels to 66 million barrels.' 39 As
the decision to increase the rate of depletion of the Hibernia field was a
fundamental decision and as such required the approval of the Provincial
Minister and the Federal Minister, the C-NLOPB provided notice of its
decision to the federal and provincial energy ministers. The government
of Newfoundland and Labrador did not approve the decision. Minister of
Mines and Energy, Paul Dicks, released a statement saying that had the
government approved the application, "more oil would have been taken
138. Ibid. at paras. 41,46-47, citing Reilly v. The King, [1934] A.C. 176 (P.C.).
139. See Press Release, "Decision on Proposed Hibernia Production Increase" (17 February 2000),
online: Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board <http://www.cnlopb.nl.ca/>.
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from the field at a lower royalty rate. Over the life of the project, this
would have negatively impacted royalties to the province." 140
While the government of Newfoundland and Labrador expressly
stated that its goal was not to reopen the Hibernia royalty agreement, its
subsequent actions clearly effected a different result than would have
obtained under the royalty agreement. The Hibernia royalty agreement
provided for a gross royalty of one percent to be increased by increments
of one percent every eighteen months to a maximum of five percent. The
increase in gross royalties under the royalty agreement was tied only to the
passage of time. The Province's position was that the ability to produce
more oil earlier represented a real saving to the consortium, as it would be
able to produce greater amounts of petroleum at a lower royalty rate.
Following negotiations between the parties, the Newfoundland
Department of Mines and Energy announced an add-on to the existing
royalty regime whereby the consortium would pay the province higher
royalty rates earlier in the term and the gross royalty rates would reflect
production levels, rather than just the passage of time. In the circumstances
described in Hibernia, the opportunity for the provincial involvement and
action arose because of the requirement, under the Newfoundland Accord
Act, for approvals from the federal and provincial ministers in relation to
a fundamental change.
Private royalty agreements will continue to be a feature of the Accord
Acts, even with the advent of generic royalty regimes, given the size of
offshore projects and the need for more certainty and specifics on key
issues than can be obtained from a generic regime. It will be interesting to
see how they develop in future.
VIII. Regulatory streamlining
The application and approval process for offshore developments has
changed since the early days of Hibernia environmental and regulatory
approval. The Boards have an important environmental mandate with
respect to offshore oil and gas, in that they must (i) monitor environmental
effects from operations, and (ii) ensure that an environmental assessment
(EA) has taken place before authorizing a project.
Three broad changes have occurred to streamline the development
application process. First, the CanadianEnvironmentalAssessment Act14" '
(CEEA) was amended in 2003 to designate a federal agency to enhance

140. See Press Release, (10 March 2000) online: Government of Newfoundland and Labrador
<http://www.releases.gov.nl.ca/releases/2000/mines&en/04lOnO2.htm>.
141. S.C. 1992, c. 37.
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coordination among regulators and reduce project delays. 42 Second,
in response to concerns that EAs were being coordinated in a less than
optimal fashion, the federal cabinet issued a directive to regulators to
better coordinate the CEAA process.' 43 Finally, a number of local and
more discrete efforts have been undertaken by the Boards to encourage
offshore development. The effect of these efforts is perhaps reflected by
the Deep Panuke application by EnCana, initially begun in 2001 following
the 1998 discovery of the pool, ultimately withdrawn and its subsequent
more efficient revival in 2006/2007.
1. Environmentalmonitoring
Environmental effects generally consist of noise, air and liquid emissions
to the marine and terrestrial environments. Operational discharges take
the form of produced water, drilling mud and cuttings, deck drainage and
bilge water, all of which must conform to the Boards' Waste Treatment
Guidelines and Chemical Selections Guidelines, as applicable. Of note,
s. 36(3) of the Fisheries Act'" (regarding deleterious substances) also
requires a discharge authorization from Fisheries and Oceans Canada, an
authorization which Board conditions or guidelines cannot satisfy owing
to their non-statutory status. An authorization in respect of the potential
"alteration, disruption or destruction of fish habitat," under section 35 of
the FisheriesAct, could create the same issue.
2. CEAA and the Accord Acts
With respect to the environmental assessment of proposed developments,
regulatory scrutiny of offshore projects is evolving towards more efficient
regulation. Streamlining efforts have responded to criticism that overly
onerous requirements discourage exploration. 145 Despite the fact that the
Boards were established to be the lead regulator of offshore project facility
approvals, other federal and provincial regulators have impacted the "one
window approach." As one commentator succinctly points out, "the
question arises, who is in charge?"' 46 Indeed, the difficulty of coordinating
suites of regulators from three different jurisdictions (federal, provincial
and joint) is reflected in a directive from the federal Cabinet to regulators

142. Elaine Hughes, Alastair R. Lucas, & William A. Tilleman, Environmental Law andPolicy, 3 d ed.
(Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd.: Toronto, 2003) at 225.
143. Federal Cabinet Directive on Implementing the CanadianEnvironmentalAssessmentAct, online:
<http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/013/010/directivese.htm>.
144. R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14.
145. Marshall Burgess, "Effective and Efficient Regulation in Nova Scotia" (2003) 26 Dal. L.J. 303.
146. Ibid.at 320.
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with respect to the implementation of the CEAA and need for increased
coordination and cooperation.
The basic model for assessing offshore development applications is
a joint federal/provincial panel considering environmental, technical and
socio-economic issues at a public hearing. Despite what may seem to be
generic and comparable structures, the regulatory challenges a proponent
faces will be significantly affected by the ultimate regulatory structure.
The major contemporary approvals are SOEP, Terra Nova, White Rose, and
both Deep Panuke processes. In between the two Deep Panuke processes
were two events which subtly altered the functioning of the CEAA and
thereby the hearing process.
First, the mandatory five-year review of the CEAA resulted in a number
of amendments in 2003. Notable in these was a new requirement for a
federal environmental assessment coordinator (FEAC). The CEA Agency
assumes this role in the case of a Comprehensive Study Report (CSR)
or joint review process.' 47 The FEAC role is to coordinate and enhance
cooperation among review participants, including federal and provincial
regulators as well as proponents and the public. It is to assist proponents
with the EA process and ensure that regulators respect timelines and
process commitments. It has been observed that, prior to establishing the
148
FEAC role, regulations establishing environmental assessment timelines
for federal regulators were poorly respected and that the FEAC role was
49
a response. 1
Second, in 2005 the federal Cabinet issued the "Cabinet Directive
on Implementing the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act" (the
Directive), 5 0 alluded to above. The Directive is to ensure "high quality
environmental assessments in a predictable, certain and timely manner." It
establishes common principles for the content of a federal EA and clarifies
the responsibility of ensuring the implementation of mitigation measures
to prevent significant adverse effects. The Directive also ensures that
senior officials become involved to ensure a coordinated federal process
and identifies a leadership role for the CEA Agency in the EA process.

147. Supra note 141, s. 12.5.
148. Regulations Respecting the Coordination by FederalAuthorities of Environmental Assessment
Proceduresand Requirements, SOR/97-181.
149. Jeffrey L. Barnes, Colleen Leeder & Robert Federico, "Environmental Assessment Crisis in
Canada: Reputation versus Reality" (Paper presented to the 25th Annual Conference of the International
Association for Impact Assessment, Boston, June 2005) at 7.
150. Supra note 143.

The Accord Acts Twenty Years Later

3. Past environmental assessments
It is instructive to consider the evolution of the various development
project assessments to date. Five "Responsible Authorities" (RAs) were
represented on the joint review panel which reviewed the SOEP project.
The panel was appointed pursuant to an agreement between the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Agency (CEA Agency), the NEB, Natural
Resources Canada (NRCan), the Nova Scotia Ministries of Natural
Resources and Environment (MNR), and the CNSOPB. The Terra Nova
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between various regulators
involved in the Project review similarly sought CEAA approval via a
joint panel in conjunction with the RAs of Environment Canada, NRCan,
Newfoundland Mines and Energy, and Newfoundland Environment and
Labour.
The White Rose project is similar to the Terra Nova project, both
in roughly equivalent depths of water and each employing a floating
production storage and offloading (FPSO) vessel. The Minister of the
Environment approved the White Rose comprehensive study report (CSR)
(the initial drafting of which was delegated to the proponent) without
referring it to a panel, as had been the case in Terra Nova.' 5' The public
hearing under a Commissioner of the C-NLOPB began upon the release of
the complete CSR and, while present in less detail, environmental issues
still formed part of the public review process. The C-NLOPB approved
White Rose, although unlike the Terra Nova decision, the C-NLOPB was
unable to accept many of the Commissioner's recommendations, often
ruling that they were outside the Board's jurisdiction.
Larger projects with the potential for significant adverse environmental
effects may have to be assessed through a comprehensive study 5 1
instead of a less-intensive screening.'53 Pursuant to section 21 of the
CEAA, a CSR results if a project, such as a production facility, is on the
Comprehensive Study List Regulation (CSL).'54 If so, the Responsible
Authority must undertake public consultation with respect to the scope of
the EA. Following public consultation, the RA must report to the Minister
with respect to potential project effects, public concerns and the ability of
a CSR to address project issues, culminating with a recommendation to
refer the project to a mediator or review panel hearing, or continue the EA
as a CSR.
151. Referring a CSR to a review panel is a matter of Ministerial Discretion per s. 29 of the CEEA,
supranote 134.
152. Supra note 141, s. 21.
153. Ibid. s. 18.
154. S.O.R./94-638.
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4. The Deep Panuke applications
The Deep Panuke EA also proceeded by way of a CSR instead of a full
CEAA panel review. The regulatory process for the first Deep Panuke
application commenced on 23 July 2001 with the filing of the Project
Description with the CEA Agency. A "Memorandum of Understanding
on Environmental Assessment Process For the Deep Panuke Project"
was signed by a number of RAs on 17 December 2001 to coordinate
the environmental reviews required by the C-NSOPB, NEB and CEAA
processes (the RAs were the C-NSOPB, NEB, DFO, Environment Canada,
Industry Canada, NRCan and the Nova Scotia Department of Environment
and Labour). The MOU delegated to EnCana the preparation of a draft
CSR with a written comment process. The MOU also established the
C-NSOPB as the lead RA and provided that the final CSR would form
part of the DPA filed by the Proponent to the C-NSOPB under the DPA
approval process.
EnCana subsequently altered the Project Description for Deep Panuke
and the CSR scoping document was amended accordingly in February,
2002. EnCana filed a draft CSR in conjunction with its DPA with the
C-NSOPB and NEB on 1 March 2002. Following the filing of the draft
CSR over 1,300 Information Requests (IRs) were submitted to EnCana
in May 2002 on the part of six community groups and nine government
departments and agencies, including the five RAs.'" In addition to the
CSR environmental review, with respect to the project the C-NSOPB
made several Project Clarification Requests between March and December
2002, requiring formal responses on the part of EnCana.
EnCana provided its response to the CSR IRs in September 2002, as
well as an additional volume to the CSR to take into account the results of
public consultation. The NEB and C-NSOPB requested further information
from EnCana on 17 October 2002. EnCana filed the final CSR on 1
November 2002. The NEB and C-NSOPB issued a Draft Joint Direction
on Procedures on 7 November 2002. An MOU was signed between the
NEB and C-NSOPB in December 2002 to establish a coordinated public
review of the project, whereby the two public hearing processes operated.
simultaneously before an appointee of each regulator. In recognition of the
length of the process to that point, the Draft Joint Direction on Procedures
initially only afforded EnCana one week in which to respond to IRs and
deprived it of the right of reply in written evidence. This restriction was
later removed.

155. C-NSOPB Annual Report, 2002-2003, at 11.

The Accord Acts Twenty Years Later

In addition, finalizing the list of issues for the hearing generated
confusion and concern among all parties with respect to the extent that
environmental issues would be considered. While the scope of the review
by the NEB and C-NSOPB was for those environmental matters not
considered by the CSR,'5 6 intervenor comments concerning the draft list
57
of issues and IRs continued to raise the environment as an issue.
On 14 February 2003 EnCana announced that it was seeking an
adjournment to the process to change its project design and better understand
the resource. While the uncertainty in respect of reserves was presaged
by the Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline hearing,'58 commentators have
noted that EnCana had stopped the process "558 days into a process that
contained no finish line"'59 and that the "excessive regulatory burden...
contributed mightily to Encana's decision to shelve Deep Panuke."' 60 The
C-NSOPB recognized this itself, noting that "to date, the environmental
assessments have placed an undue burden on the industry in preparing the
assessments"' 6' and it would develop a "more efficient and cooperative
review [process] pending a new application."' 62
An MOU between Environment Canada, DFO, Transport Canada,
NRCan, the NEB, the C-NSOPB and the Nova Scotia Department of
Energy and Labour was signed on 19 February 2005, with the purpose of,
inter alia,fostering regulatory cooperation and avoiding duplication.
EnCana drilled two new wells during the next three years and enhanced
its reservoir simulations. In the summer of 2006 the Province of Nova
Scotia announced that it and EnCana had negotiated the OSEA. On 28
August 2006, the CEA Agency announced. that the previous regulators
were responsible for recommending how a new project should proceed.

156. Joint C-NSOPB/NEB letter of 22 January 2003 regarding final List Of Issues, online: <https://
www.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-eng/livelink.exe?fun=ll&objld=2574 10&objAction=browse>.
157. For example, the Ecology Action Coalition, Heartland Resources and the Province of New
Brunswick were all concerned with environmental issues. Heartland Resources was concerned with
compensation following environmental effects and the Province of New Brunswick also demanded
that EnCana update the gas supply evidence from the M&NP pipeline hearing.
158. Gordon M. Nettleton, "Recent Regulatory and Legislative Developments of Interest to Oil
and Gas Lawyers"(2004) 42 Alta. L. Rev. 247, noting the "step-down" shipping option available to
EnCana in its gas shipper contract was a particular concern of the Board, and rather than justifying the
need for the pipeline based on demonstrated basin supply, the Board looked at basin "prospectivity."
159. Ian M. Doig and Associates Inc., Doig's Digest (December 2006).
160. Brian Crowley, President, Atlantic.Institute for Market Studies, "Sorting Out Fact From Emotion
in the Offshore: Everybody Take a Valium," (Paper presented to the Atlantic Institute for Market
Studies, May 2004) at 5.
161. C.A. Parker, C-NSOPB, "Environmental Considerations Related to Petroleum Activities
Offshore Nova Scotia," (Paper presented to the offshore Petroleum Conference, Houston, Texas, May
2005) Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, Texas, May 2005.
162. C-NSOPB, Annual Report, 2003-2004, at 10.
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EnCana reapplied to the NEB and C-NSOPB on 9 November 2006,
with an updated DPA and EIS and having negotiated the OSEA with the
Province. On the same day, the Minister of the Environment determined
that the project should continue as a CSR, without a public hearing.
The updated CSR was released for public comment on 11 June 2007
and was unique in that it:
1. was informed by the joint report previously issued by the
C-NSOPB and NEB members;
2. reflected only the differences resulting from project design
changes; and
3.

was authored by the C-NSOPB, the NEB, DFO, Transport Canada
and Industry Canada with input from Environment Canada and
NRCan.

The second hearing lasted only one week and on the whole was remarkably
efficient as compared to the initial attempt. This is attributed, in part,
to the role of the CEA Agency as the FEAC, ensuring that regulators
respected timelines and remained in communication. There was also
a smooth coordination of issues and proceedings between the NEB,
C-NSOPB and Deep Panuke Secretariat. Additionally, at the hearing stage
EnCana only sat a single skilled expert panel, rather than a series of topical
panels, which streamlined the physical hearing process. It did, however,
provoke complaints from some intervenors who expected the opportunity
to cross-examine subsequent panels.
To provide a sense of the changed timelines, EnCana responded to
government regulators' IRs on 12 January 2007, and to other parties' IRs
on 19 January 2007, having had approximately two weeks to respond in
each case (although the NEB also posed IRs in advance of the main suite
of requests). Following the filing of reply evidence on 26 February 2007
the hearing began on 5 March 2007 and concluded on 9 March 2007. The
second process contrasted strongly with the first attempt.
The joint environmental report was released on 11 April 2007 with
both appointees concluding that, following mitigation, the project was
unlikely to cause significant adverse environmental effects. The C-NSOPB
commissionerissued her individual report on 8 May 2007, the most notable
aspect of which being the rejection of the Benefits Plan portion of the
application (as previously discussed). An additional concern was the end
use of Deep Panuke's volumes, which the C-NSOPB was recommended to
investigate, relating to both climate change and local gas market concerns.
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Finally, the NEB member issued his final report, also recommending the
project, on 18 July 2007.
The second hearing benefited from well-understood issues, not only as
a result of the first process and a previously-approved CSR, but from the
precedent setby SOEPandother offshoreprojects. The panel and intervenors
were familiar with both the hearing process and the considerations at play.
The hearing process succeeded, in other words, in part because of its lack
of novelty. In addition, cooperation and coordination between regulators
allowed for reasonable timelines and an organized IR process. It is to be
hoped that this spirit of cooperation, possibly resulting from the effects of
the Cabinet Directive and FEAC role, will continue into any subsequent
offshore development application hearings. Furthermore, early and active
management of the process should ensure that delays in the schedule and
appeal risks are minimized.
5. Other streamliningefforts
A number of other streamlining efforts have also been made recently.
On 19 April 2007, the C-NSOPB announced a lower cost second tier
exploration licence will come into effect in October 2007 with a term of
between two and three years, aimed at encouraging offshore Nova Scotia
exploration by no longer requiring up-front long-term commitments. A
corollary to new exploration is a state-of-the-art data management system
and revamped, regulatory competitive bids featuring packaged data to, in
conjunction with lowered drilling costs and obligations, better circulate
offshore geoscience information.
In addition, as of November 2005, following a change to the CSL,
offshore oil and gas exploratory drilling projects are no longer subject to
CSRs. Similarly, as mentioned above, the C-NSOPB, C-NLOPB, NEB
and other federal and provincial authorities also entered into a MOU for
coordinated environmental offshore regulations in early 2005. While this
includes parallel processing of regulatory documents, including any EIS
or DPAs, it is not yet a "one-window" approach.
Conclusion
Numerous issues have tested the arrangements under the AccordActs over
the past twenty years.
The Courts called upon to interpret these arrangements to date appear
comfortable doing so in the spirit of the joint management regime and in
dealing with the questions of legislative interpretation, scope and standards
of judicial review, burdens of proof and evidentiary and decision-making
requirements that have come before them. They have recognized, at the
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highest levels, that a core purpose of the Accord Acts is to ensure a stable
and fair management regime for industry.
The Boards have made efforts, where permitted by the Accord Acts,
to clarify and supplement perceived gaps in the legislation and regulations
through the use of guidelines and to give these force, in some cases, by
making compliance with these guidelines conditions of their various
approvals. Courts have recognized and generally been supportive of the
Board's powers to do in a way that makes these efforts effective and
of real consequence to the parties subject to them. The opportunity for
such efforts of the Boards arises in part from the inability or unwillingness
of the federal and provincial governments to properly address, through
legislation and regulation (notwithstanding the long experience of other
Canadian jurisdictions, such as Alberta, in dealing with similar issues)
the gaps and inefficiencies in the applicable legislative and regulatory
scheme. Unfortunately, the Accord Acts do not recognize a regulationmaking authority on the part of the Boards, and do not give the Boards
a proper suite of remedies to deal with failure of a party to observe the
guidelines the Board has established.
The Board's powers with respect to benefits plans have been
confirmed and earlier practices with respect to benefits plans are likely
to be reconsidered in light of recent affirmations of the Boards' powers
to monitor and modify the obligations arising under general statements of
principle.
Changes in production testing methodologies and technological
improvements in other areas of petroleum operations that have made
the original approaches to some issues under the Accord Acts outmoded
or at least questionable have been addressed in some instances, such as
production flow testing, although only after long delays and not in as
effective a manner as one would prefer.
Third party access to facilities, an issue that has been addressed by
project proponents and used as a basis for their planning from the beginning
of major developments under the AccordActs, may become more important
as fields and basins mature and facilities costs and requirements increase
and have been dealt with to date by a combination of private contractual
arrangements, stand-alone facilities available to their owners and others
on a service agreement basis, and through conditions of Board approvals.
Again, the role of the Boards under the AccordActs needs to be reviewed
and considered in the light of regulatory practices and experiences in other
jurisdictions dealing with similar issues.
Private royalty agreements, also a feature of major developments under
the Accord Acts from the beginning, have continued to be utilized (and
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respected by the parties to them) as a means of particularizing that aspect
of the fiscal regime applicable to a particular project and in an attempt to
improve the certainty of treatment in that area for proponents investing in
major projects.
The approach to the regulatory regime shows some signs of changing
in favour of a "smart" system and the process of streamlining review and
hearing procedures continues and appears to be making good progress in
some areas, as evidenced by the recent Deep Panuke hearings.
There remain, however, numerous instances where the Boards,
proponents and governments have resorted to ad hoc solutions to what
are really recurring or industry-wide issues. The system cries out for a
coordinated, informed response from the ultimate rule-making authorities
under the joint management regimes - the federal and provincial
governments. Canadians have a world-class resource opportunity in
the east coast offshore and have to date enjoyed world class projects to
develop them. It is unfortunate that they suffer from an inadequate and
incomplete system to regulate the complex activities necessary to develop
these resources. It is even more unfortunate (and inexcusable) when other
jurisdictions in Canada, though far from perfect, have already done, and
have extensive experience under systems including many of the things
necessary from a legal and regulatory standpoint to deal with the areas
that go begging under the Accord Acts. The inaction of successive federal
governments in the area is an embarrassment to all Canadians, not just
to those who live in Atlantic Canada. Yet in the current political climate
in Ottawa it is difficult to imagine an enthusiastic federal involvement in
any effort to put things right. And in case of the joint management regime
under. the AccordActs, it takes two to fix it.

